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I. INTRODUCTION
INCE 1988, organizations have focused greater attention on compli-
ance programs designed to prevent insider trading by their personnel.
In that year, the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
[Vol. 471784
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Act (ITSFEA) ! was enacted into law. Certainly, insider trading was a con-
cern to organizations before that legislation, 2 but the 1988 Act increased an
organization's potential liability for the insider trading of its employees and
imposed an affirmative duty on broker-dealers and investment advisors to
maintain reasonably effective written compliance programs. 3
This article examines the compliance programs that different organiza-
tions have implemented in response to the new liability framework. Specifi-
cally, the article will review compliance programs that have been suggested
and adopted in three different contexts: professional firms, with an emphasis
on law and accounting firms; financial intermediaries such as broker-dealers,
investment companies, investment advisors, and banks; and publicly-held
companies. This article proposes elements of an insider trading compliance
program that should be considered by any organization whose business mer-
its a compliance program, and it recommends specific measures that should
be adopted by organizations within the three contexts mentioned above.
II. INSIDER TRADING BACKGROUND
A. CONCERNS BEFORE ITSFEA
Before Congress passed ITSFEA, organizations had incentives to main-
tain compliance programs in order to avoid liability for the insider trading of
their personnel.4 Under the federal securities laws, Section 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act (Exchange Act or 1934 Act)5 and rule lOb-5 6 pre-
scribed thereunder have been and continue to be the principal sources of the
prohibition against insider trading of securities. 7 The controlling person
provision, Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, creates potential liability for,
among others, employers of inside traders.8 Under such circumstances, the
controlling person has a good faith defense against liability.9 This defense
1. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704,
102 Stat. 4677 (1988) [hereinafter ITSFEA or 1988 Act].
2. See, e.g., William R. Harman, The Chinese Wall in Twelfth Annual Institute on Se-
curities Regulation 421 (A. Fleischer, Jr. et al. eds. 1981); Theodore A. Levine et al., Multiser-
vice Securities Firms: Coping with Conflicts in a Tender Offer Context, 23 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 41, 59 (1988); Richard M. Phillips, Insider Trading Controls for Law Firms, 23 Rev. Sec.
& Comm. Reg. 113, 115 (1990).
3. See generally Howard Friedman, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforce-
ment Act of 1988, 68 N.C. L. REV. 465 (1990); Larry Lavoie, The Insider Trading and Securi-
ties Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 22 Rev. Sec. & Comm. Reg. 1 (1989); John F. Olson et al.,
Recent Insider Trading Developments: The Search for Clarity, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 715 (1991).
4. See discussion infra notes 5-18 and accompanying text.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
7. See 3 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COM-
MODITIES FRAUD § 7.2 (1992); VIII Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 3547-3769 (3d ed. 1991).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988) (subject to good faith defense, imposing joint and several
liability on "[e]very person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder").
9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter Exchange Act or 1934 Act] § 20(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988) (A controlling person is liable for the subordinate's actions unless he
"acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the
violation or cause of action."). Even after ITSFEA's passage, § 20(a) may be applicable in the
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provides an incentive to implement procedures to preserve confidential infor-
mation and to deter insider trading.10
Organizations also face potential liability under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, which imposes liability on a principal for violations of law commit-
ted by its agent when such agent acts within the scope of his or her employ-
ment with actual or apparent authority."l  Some courts have refused to
apply respondeat superior under the federal securities laws on the ground
that such application would undermine the good faith defense of the control-
ling person provisions. 12 The majority of courts, however, have applied re-
spondeat superior to the federal securities laws on the theory that the
controlling person provisions supplemented (rather than supplanted) com-
mon law agency theories in order to reach individuals, such as intermediate
supervisors, who had no agency or employment relationship with the pri-
mary violators. Under this rationale, application of respondeat superior to
the entity remains appropriate.
13
In a prelude to the 1988 Act, Congress passed the Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act of 1984 (ITSA) 14 which enabled the Securities and Exchange
Commission (Commission or SEC) to obtain treble monetary penalties
against inside traders.15 By its terms, ITSA generally imposed no derivative
liability on the employer of the inside trader unless the employer, such as a
broker-dealer, illegally tipped inside information to others. 16 ITSA also
insider trading context, such as in private actions for damages. See infra note 34 and accompa-
nying text.
10. See Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary - The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984
and Its Effect on Existing Law, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1273, 1284 (1984).
11. See Carol B. Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A Critical Assessment of the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 85 DUKE L.J. 960, 971 n.71. See generally Ralph C. Ferrara &
Diane Sanger, Derivative Liability in Securities Law: Controlling Person Liability, Respondeat
Superior, and Aiding and Abetting, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1007 (1983).
12. See, e.g., Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Va. 1981).
13. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc);
Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1981); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas
Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629
F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980). Note that, in its enactment of ITSFEA in 1988, Congress precluded
respondeat superior liability in private actions brought by contemporaneous traders based on
alleged insider trading violations. See § 20A(3) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t-l(b)(3) (1988). But see Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114
S. Ct. 1439 (1994) (holding that aider and abettor liability may not be imposed in private
actions under § 10(b) and arguably implying the rejection of respondeat superior under the
federal securities laws).
14. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984). See generally Langevoort, supra note 10;
Silver, supra note 11; Note, Stephen Bainbridge, A Critique of the Insider Trading Sanctions
Act of 1984, 71 VA. L. REV. 455 (1985).
15. ITSA § 2 (originally codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A)); ITSFEA amended and
recodified this section at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(2) (1988). The treble damage provision was
enacted in response to criticism that "it often was impractical [for the SEC] to impose a greater
sanction than forcing the violator to give back his ill-gotten gains and to promise never to do it
again." Stuart J. Kaswell, An Insider's View of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud En-
forcement Act of 1988, 45 Bus. LAW. 145, 153 (1989).
16. Kaswell, supra note 15, at 154. See Harold S. Bloomenthal, Insider Trading and Se-
curities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 11 Sec. and Fed. L. Rep. No. 7, at 49, 53 (July-Aug.
1989). Theodore A. Levine, Insider Trading Act Broadens Enforcement Scope, LEGAL TIMES
OF WASHINGTON, Sept. 10, 1984, at 17 ("Tippers are exposed to the penalty as aiders and
abettors, but not so a broker who merely executes the trade").
1786 [Vol. 47
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specified that neither the doctrine of respondeat superior nor the controlling
person provision, Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, would apply to its pen-
alties. 17 Moreover, ITSA explicitly stated that "[n]o person shall be subject
to penalty under subsection (a) of this section solely by reason of employing
another person who is subject to penalty under such subsection .. ."18
B. CONTROL PERSON LIABILITY UNDER THE INSIDER TRADING AND
SECURITIES FRAUD ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1988
Congress enacted the ITSFEA in response to a series of Wall Street trad-
ing scandals 19 and in order to restore confidence in the securities markets in
the wake of the stock market crash of October 1987.20 At the time of ITSA,
the Congress believed that the SEC had adequate enforcement remedies with
respect to broker-dealers and other controlling persons. Accordingly, it did
not extend the treble penalties of ITSA to controlling persons or to employ-
ers under principles of respondeat superior. 2 1 The insider trading scandals
of the late 1980s, however, undermined this perception and led to a belief
that the problem of insider trading was an institutional one.22 As a central
component of the legislation's effort to provide a greater deterrent to insider
trading, ITSFEA expanded the scope of civil penalties for " 'controlling per-
sons' who fail to take adequate steps to prevent insider trading. ' 23 Further-
more, it required broker-dealers and investment advisors to maintain
procedures that are reasonably designed to prevent insider trading abuses by
17. ITSA § 2, supra note 14, 98 Stat. at 1264 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(2));
see Langevoort, supra note 10, at 1282-83.
18. ITSA § 2, supra note 14, at 1264; see MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA,
SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT § 2:13 (1985 & 1994 Supp.).
19. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, H.R. REP. No. 910,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 11-14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6044, 6048-51
[hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. The House Report noted that despite the stiffer penalties im-
posed by ITSA, the dramatic rise of insider trading cases illustrated the need for a legislative
response. The report pointed to the cases of Dennis Levine, Ivan Boesky, and Martin Siegel,
the "Yuppie Five," among others. Id.; see JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991).
20. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 6044. As stated by one source: "The October 1987
crash was the largest stock market crash ever experienced in the United States." Lawrence
Harris, The Dangers of Regulatory Overreaction to the October 1987 Crash, 74 CORNELL L.
REV. 927, 927 (1989). See generally C. Edward Fletcher III, Of Crashes, Corrections, and the
Culture of Financial Information - What They Tell Us About the Need for Federal Securities
Regulation, 54 Mo. L. REV. 515 (1989); Lewis D. Solomon & Howard B. Dicker, The Crash of
1987. A Legal and Public Policy Analysis, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 191 (1988).
21. See Bloomenthal, supra note 16, at 54.
22. Id. The House Report stated:
The recent wave of cases has cast serious doubt on the effectiveness of firm su-
pervisory procedures .... [Q]uestions have been raised about the efficacy of
some firms "Chinese Walls..... The mergers and acquisitions departments of
investment houses contain highly sensitive materials..., invaluable information
in the hands of skilled market professionals. In the view of the Committee,
there is a need for an affirmative statutory obligation for every broker, dealer
and investment advisor to design effective procedures to restrict and monitor
access to such information and prevent insider trading. The Committee links
this affirmative obligation to the ITSA penalties.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 6052.
23. House Report, supra note 19, at 6044.
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their employees and associated persons. 24
The new penalties for controlling persons under ITSFEA were intended to
"increase the economic incentives for such persons to supervise vigorously
their employees."'25 Section 21A(a)(3) grants authority to the Commission
to seek civil penalties against controlling persons up to the "greater of
$1,000,000, or three times the amount of the profit gained or loss avoided"
by the inside trader.26 Under this provision, controlling persons face the
potential of massive liability exposure for each insider trading violation by
their employees or associated persons. 27
While ITSFEA increased the amount of civil penalties that the Commis-
sion could seek against controlling persons, it adopted a new standard of
liability for these enhanced penalties. To recover these penalties, the Com-
mission must prove that the controlling person "knew or recklessly disre-
garded the fact that such controlled person was likely to engage in the act or
acts constituting the violations and failed to take appropriate steps to pre-
vent such act or acts before they occurred. '28 ITSFEA does not define
"knowing" or "reckless" behavior, but the legislative history suggests that
"[t]he risk involved must be such that to disregard it would constitute a
24. Id. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(f), 80b-4a (1988). In the recently enacted Government Se-
curities Act Amendments of 1993, H.R. REP. No. 255, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24, (1993)
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2993, 3012-13, Congress once again emphasized that broker-
dealers must establish and implement reasonably adequate procedures. As stated in the House
Report:
The Committee believes that the Salomon Brothers scandal and its aftermath
have amply demonstrated the need to heighten the commitment of government
securities brokers and dealers to assuring that their employees comply with the
applicable provisions of the federal securities laws. To help deter fraud and ma-
nipulation in the government securities market, the Committee believes that it is
necessary to reemphasize the need for government securities brokers and dealers
to establish internal controls to prevent such violations. The general responsibil-
ity of brokers and dealers to supervise their employees in order to prevent viola-
tions of law is well established. For example, Section 15(b)(4)(E) of the
Exchange Act authorizes the Commission to impose various sanctions on firms
who do not meet their responsibilities. In addition, self-regulatory organizations
have rules requiring the establishment of supervisory procedures.
To supplement these general rules, the Committee believes it is necessary that
firms not only improve the supervision of their employees but that they imple-
ment written policies and procedures designed to prevent fraud and manipula-
tion in connection with transactions in government securities. In addition, the
bill would permit each appropriate regulatory agency, in its discretion, to re-
quire such policies and procedures with respect to other provisions of the federal
securities laws. The Salomon Brothers scandal revealed both that certain em-
ployees were willing to flout the laws and that the firm's senior management
explicitly or implicitly condoned such actions. Comprehensive compliance poli-
cies provide mechanisms that encourage low and mid-level employees to meet
their legal obligations and signal to such employees that senior management will
not tolerate violators.
H.R. REP. No. 255, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 24-24 (1993), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2993,
3012-3.
25. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 6054.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(3) (1988).
27. Note that a controlling person includes not only an employer but also "any person
with power to influence or control the direction or the management, policies, or activities of
another person." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 6054.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(1)(A) (1988).
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gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
exercise in such a situation."'29
If the controlling person is a broker-dealer or investment advisor, IT-
SFEA provides the Commission with more potent ammunition for imposing
the new monetary penalties. ITSFEA sets forth an affirmative duty on bro-
ker-dealers and investment advisors to maintain adequate procedures to pro-
tect against insider trading and it defines a separate standard for controlling
person liability in reference to that duty. First, ITSFEA added Section 15(f)
of the Exchange Act 30 and Section 204A of the Investment Advisors Act of
1940 (Advisors Act)31 which impose an affirmative duty on broker-dealers
and investment advisors to maintain "written policies and procedures rea-
sonably designed" to prevent insider trading violations. 32 Second, Section
21A(b)(1)(B) subjects broker-dealers and investment advisors to controlling
person liability if they "knowingly or recklessly failed to establish, maintain,
or enforce" those procedures and "such failure substantially contributed to
or permitted the occurrence" of the insider trading violation. 3 3
When ITSFEA defined these new standards of controlling person liability
29. HouSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 6055. Elaborating, the House Report stated:
Under Subsection (1)(A), the Commission must establish either "knowing" or
"reckless" behavior on the part of the controlling person as a predicate for the
imposition of a [treble] civil penalty against the controlling person. The statute
does not define the terms "knowing" or "reckless." In order to seek imposition
of a civil penalty, the Commission must establish that a controlling person ob-
jectively disregarded a risk that a controlled person was engaged in violations of
the insider trading laws. The risk involved must be such that to disregard it
would constitute a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would exercise in such a situation. For example, "recklessness" encom-
passes a heedless indifference as to whether circumstances suggesting employee
violations actually exist. The Committee's concern in this context is with an
objective standard of supervision which, if breached, will result in the imposition
of substantial civil fines.
The controlling person is responsible under this subsection if it fails to take an
appropriate action once it knew or was reckless in disregarding indications that
its controlled person was engaging in insider trading or tipping. An aiding and
abetting standard was specifically considered and rejected by the Committee.
Id.
30. Section 15(f) of Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(f) (1988).
31. Section 204A of Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4a (1988).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(f), 80b-4a (1988).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(l)(B) (1988). As stated in the House Report:
Section 2 1A(b)(1)(B) operates in tandem with Section 15(f) of the Exchange
Act and Section 204A of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. These sections
impose upon broker-dealers and advisers an affirmative duty to institute, main-
tain and enforce a reasonable and proper system of supervision, surveillance and
internal control to protect against securities laws violations. A penalty may be
imposed under Subsection (1)(B) where the failure to establish, maintain and
enforce an appropriate supervisory system has "substantially contributed to or
permitted" the violation's occurrence. While the failure to establish, maintain,
or enforce the policy or procedure must be relevant to the conduct leading to the
controlled person's violations, this provision does not condition responsibility
for possible sanction upon proof that but for the controlled person's breach the
violation would not have occurred. It is sufficient that the breach thereby al-
lowed the violation to occur, or that it provided assistance to the controlled
person's violations.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 6055.
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for its enhanced civil penalties, it specifically provided that the controlling
person standard of Section 20(a) and the principles of respondeat superior
would not apply to the new penalties. 34 Thus, in this context, a controlling
person need not prove that he acted in good faith and that he did not directly
or indirectly induce the controlled person's violations. Instead, the Commis-
sion must establish knowing or reckless behavior on the part of the control-
ling person. 35 As a result of this new standard and the preclusion of
respondeat superior liability in this setting, ITSFEA arguably softens the
impact of its enhanced penalties by imposing a more difficult burden of proof
on the Commission. Nonetheless, given the astronomical liability exposure
and the emergence of organizational compliance programs directed against
insider trading as an industry norm,36 the absence of a reasonably effective
compliance program in this context makes little sense.37 In a situation
where an employee or other associated person engages in insider trading and
the organization lacks reasonably adequate procedures, the distinct risk that
the SEC will initiate an enforcement action still remains. 38 By alleging that
the organization (or other controlling person) failed to meet ITSFEA's com-
pliance standards, the Commission may seek a plethora of remedies, includ-
ing the levying of a monetary penalty. 39
III. BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
Organizations should assess the nature of their business to determine the
risks of insider trading and the need for preventive policies. A key determi-
nant is the extent that an enterprise's personnel come into possession of ma-
terial, nonpublic information about publicly-traded securities during the
course of their work.4° This article focuses on three types of organizations
34. Section 21A(b)(2) of Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(2) (1988). Nonetheless, in
other contexts involving insider trading, such as in private actions for damages and SEC ac-
tions for disgorgement, the controlling person provision of Section 20(a) remains viable.
35. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 2, at 114-15; David S. Ruder, Development of a Corporate
Disclosure Compliance Program, 6 Insights No. 6, at 3, 6 (June 1992).
37. See, e.g., Ruder, supra note 36, at 6 ("It is important that the corporation establish a
formal insider trading policy."); authorities cited supra note 2; discussion infra notes 307-14
and accompanying text.
38. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 115 ("Given the Commission's admonition [that law
firms have an obligation to safeguard inside information - see Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 13437 (1977)], the large number of law firm personnel involved in insider trading cases,
and the harsh penalties of ITSFEA, an increasing number of law firms have decided to adopt
formal insider trading policies.").
39. Although not discussed herein, ITSFEA also (1) amended Section 32(a) of the Ex-
change Act to increase the maximum criminal fine and term of imprisonment, (2) created a
new Section 20(A) to provide a private right of action for "contemporaneous traders," and (3)
established a bounty provision to authorize the SEC to award up to ten percent of the civil
penalty imposed or the amount disgorged to persons who provide information with respect to
insider trading violations. See Sections 20A, 21A(e), and 32(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78t-l(a), 78u-l(e), 78ff(a) (1988) (as amended by ITSFEA).
40. See Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, Compliance Programs Under the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 at 8, The University of California, San
Diego Nineteenth Annual Securities Regulation Institute (1992) (stating that "firms whose
employees have access to confidential information that could affect the market price of securi-
1790 [Vol. 47
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that are most often implicated in insider trading situations: professional
firms, especially law and accounting firms; financial intermediaries such as
broker-dealers, investment advisors, and banks; and publicly-held compa-
nies. 41 At a minimum, any organization within these three categories should
examine such factors as the size and nature of its business in the adoption of
insider trading policies and procedures. The organization should reexamine
its findings in light of changed conditions on a periodic basis.42
If an organization determines the need for an insider trading policy, the
policy adopted may focus on three areas: (1) educating employees about the
prohibitions and risks of insider trading; (2) implementing procedures to
help prevent and detect abuses in this context; and (3) adopting mechanisms
to limit access to confidential information. 43 Even a very general policy
should cover the first area of educating the organization's employees and
disseminating a clear statement that articulatesthe basic prohibitions against
insider trading (and tipping).44
A. ELEMENTS OF AN EDUCATION POLICY
All insider trading policies should provide a concise, nontechnical defini-
tion of what constitutes insider trading.45 The definition of insider trading
should make clear that both trading and tipping are prohibited and that the
tipping prohibition covers spouses, members of households, and friends. 46
Likewise, the definition should make clear that insider trading prohibitions
apply to securities of non-clients. 47 The policy, moreover, should provide
definitions of key terms like materiality 48 and nonpublic. 49 It is also helpful
ties operate at their peril if they fail to take appropriate steps to prevent insider trading viola-
tions by their employees").
41. See infra notes 69-348 and accompanying text.
42. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 115 (asserting that firms should consider "a wide variety
of factors, such as the size of the firm, number and locations of its offices, nature of its commu-
nication systems, prior problems with insider trading, firm culture, and most important of all,
the nature of the firm's practice").
43. See American Bar Association's Subcommittee on Civil Litigation and SEC Enforce-
ment Matters, Law Firm Policies Regarding Insider Trading and Confidentiality, 47 Bus.
LAW. 235, 240-58 (1991) [hereinafter ABA Report] (reviewing law firm policies); Phillips,
supra note 2, at 114-17.
44. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 40, at 14 ("For many companies, the use of a policy
statement, properly disseminated and enforced, will be sufficient.").
45. See MARC I. STEINBERG, CORPORATE AND SECURITIES MALPRACTICE 95-104 (1992)
(providing sample policy for law firms); ABA Report, supra note 43, at 241-46 (reviewing law
firm policies and providing different examples of definitions of insider trading).
46. ABA Report, supra note 43, at 247 (providing sample definitions that make clear that
tipping information to one's spouse or minor children is also prohibited).
47. In the case of publicly-held companies, the policy would make clear that the prohibi-
tion also applies to securities of other companies. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 115.
48. ABA Report, supra note 43, at 243-44 (providing three sample definitions of material
information). One such example provides that "material information means information re-
lating to a company with publicly-traded securities, its business operations or securities, the
public dissemination of which would likely affect the market price of any of its securities, or
which would likely be considered important by a reasonable investor in determining whether
to buy, sell, or hold such securities." Id. at 243; see also Steinberg, supra note 45, at 97.
49. Steinberg, supra note 45, at 98; ABA Report, supra note 43, at 244-45. The definition
should also explain when information becomes public. Steinberg, supra note 45, at 98 (listing
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to provide examples of inside information that an organization's personnel
would be likely to encounter.50 The'policy should outline the potentially
severe consequences of insider trading, such as incurring substantial civil
and criminal penalties. 51 It should also specify the impact of violations on
employment with the organization. 52 Finally, the policy should provide the
name of an individual who may be contacted to answer any questions about
the policy. 53
B. ADMINISTRATIVE STEPS TO IMPLEMENT POLICY
An organization should adopt procedures only if it has the commitment to
observe and to enforce them. The policies and procedures implemented
should reflect the level of risk that insider trading in the organization may
eventuate. 54 An enterprise whose operations involve relatively few opportu-
nities for insider trading may have the need to adopt only a basic policy
statement. 55 On the other hand, the greater risks present in a broker-
dealer's business merit a more extensive policy.56 Moreover, ITSFEA (as
reflected in its legislative history and as codified in Section 15(f) of the Ex-
change Act and Section 204A of the Advisors Act) mandates the implemen-
tation of reasonably effective procedures. 57
To implement a basic education policy, an organization should distribute
media through which information can be publicly disseminated, such as Dow Jones broad
tape, wire services, radio, television, and widely circulated newspapers and magazines).
50. Examples of inside information: information concerning mergers, acquisitions, anti-
trust charges, threats of litigation, financial statements, income projections, proposed changes
in dividend rates, labor disputes, pending large commercial or governmental contracts, key
personnel changes, possible initiation of a proxy fight, major new products or services, and
significant shifts in operating or financial circumstances (such as major write-offs and strikes at
major plants). See Steinberg, supra note 45, at 97; ABA Report, supra note 43, at 242-44.
51. See, e.g., § 21A(a)(2) of Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(2) (1988) (persons who
commit insider trading violations face civil fine up to the greater of $1,000,000 or three times
the amount of any profit gained or loss avoided in the transaction); § 32(a) of Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1988) (willful violations of the securities laws can incur potential criminal
penalties up to $1,000,000, imprisonment up to 10 years, or both); § 21(d)(2) of Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (Supp. III 1992) (under certain circumstances, persons found to violate
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act can be barred from serving as officer or director of an
Exchange Act company).
52. For example, violations by company personnel may be grounds for dismissal. See
ABA Report, supra note 43, at 256; Robert A. Barron, Model Memoranda, 17 SEC. REG. L.J.
195, 202 (1989).
53. See Barron, supra note 52, at 201-02 (providing a model policy on insider trading that
could be distributed to all employees of a publicly-held corporation).
54. See, e.g., Kaswell, supra note 15, at 164 (Because "firms have different types of busi-
nesses with different types of risk ... a small discount broker-dealer would not need nearly as
extensive a surveillance system as a major firm with divisions engaged in retail brokerage,
investment banking, investment advisory services, arbitrage, and specialist operations.").
55. See, e.g., Phillips & Miller, supra note 40, at 14.
56. See infra notes 120-299 and accompanying text.
57. See § 15(f) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 780(0 (1988); § 204(A) of the Advisors
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(a); see House Report, supra note 19, at 6058 ("The requirements of
these new statutory provisions reflect the Committee's belief that broker-dealers and invest-
ment advisers must not only adopt and disseminate written policies and procedures to prevent




copies of the policy to all personnel and obtain signed acknowledgments that
the policy was read, understood, and will be followed. 58 The organization
should consider holding training sessions to explain the policy. 59 The organ-
ization should designate a person or a committee to monitor the implemen-
tation of the policy. This compliance official or committee should include
high-level personnel with significant supervisory responsibilities. 60 The com-
pliance personnel would be responsible for implementing a procedure that
requires all employees, temporary and permanent, to sign acknowledgments
when they begin work. Organizations should also consider providing em-
ployees with a mechanism that would allow them to ask questions about the
policy and to report possible violations in an anonymous fashion and with-
out fear of retribution.6 '
Generally, the greatest flaws in existing compliance programs relate to
enforcement and documentation. 62 An organization whose compliance pro-
gram lacks these attributes incurs the risk of substantial liability exposure.
One study on the legal effectiveness of compliance programs shows that
outside observers often view them with skepticism. 63 Courts may well scru-
tinize the procedures adopted to assess their implementation, probable effec-
tiveness, the timing of their implementation, and the seriousness of the
organization's commitment to the procedures. An organization that cannot
document the efforts taken pursuant to its compliance program will face a
significant burden when trying to prove its effectiveness to an outside
party. 64 In this respect, an organization would be ill advised to adopt any
nonessential component of a program that cannot be feasibly implemented.
Stated succinctly, once a compliance program is adopted, the organization
58. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 2, at 115.
59. Id. See ABA Report, supra note 43, at 247-48.
60. See infra notes 315-17 and accompanying text, discussing the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission guidelines on effective institutional policies. These sentencing guidelines define seven
elements of an effective compliance program, one of which is the designation of a high-level
person as the responsible person.
61. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (suggesting this mechanism), infra notes 315-17 and
accompanying text (discussing these guidelines).
62. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Crimi-
nal Liability. A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1604 (1990)
(stating that enforcement is weak in the majority of corporate compliance programs); infra
notes 231-99 and accompanying text; see also Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpin-
nings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 209 (1993) ("There is
increasing evidence in recent months that many American businesses are revisiting - or consid-
ering seriously for the first time - their in-house policies toward employee noncompliance with
the law and related misconduct.").
63. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 62, at 1630-31 (stating that critics of compli-
ance programs see them as self-serving, public relations ploys).
64. See id. at 1639-42; SEC Division of Market Regulation, Broker-Dealer Policies and
Procedures Designed to Segment the Flow and Prevent the Misuse of Material Nonpublic Infor-
mation, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,520 at 80,626 (1990) [here-
inafter SEC Division Report] (asserting that a broker-dealer's "failure to maintain
documentation sufficient to re-create actions taken pursuant to Chinese wall procedures will




"must abide by it. ' ' 65
An organization should consider requiring its compliance personnel to re-
port periodically on the program's implementation to help document its ef-
forts. The persons responsible should report to an oversight committee,
composed of individuals with high-level responsibility and some indepen-
dence from the head of compliance. In these reports, some documentation
of compliance efforts should be provided. Such documentation could in-
clude a log of all training sessions with the dates, number of persons attend-
ing, and the topics covered. A log tracking the dates that the organization's
personnel executed the required acknowledgments or certifications also may
be kept. An underlying objective should be documentation that illustrates
the efforts taken by the organization to substantiate its efforts to outside
parties. 66
Any organization whose employees may have access to material, nonpub-
lic information would be prudent to promulgate a basic education policy.
Many organizations whose operations merit a compliance program will im-
plement additional procedures that are aimed at the prevention and detec-
tion of insider trading.67 Next, this article will address the combinations of
procedures used by professional firms, financial intermediaries, and publicly-
held corporations.
IV. PROFESSIONAL FIRMS: ACCOUNTING AND LAW FIRMS
A. POSITIONS ON ADOPTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES REGARDING
INSIDER TRADING
In recent years, many law and accounting firms have adopted policies and
procedures regarding insider trading.68 Unlike broker-dealers and invest-
ment advisors, lawyers and accountants do not have an affirmative duty
under ITSFEA to maintain written policies and procedures designed to pre-
vent the abuse of inside information. 69 On several occasions, however, the
SEC and its personnel have argued that professional firms have an affirma-
tive duty to adopt procedures to protect confidential information. 70
65. Dan K. Webb & Steven F. Molo, Some Practical Considerations in Developing Effec-
tive Compliance Programs: A Framework for Meeting the Requirements of the Sentencing
Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 375, 379 (1993) ("A sentencing court will deem a program
'noneffective' - based on lack of enforcement - if the company fails to follow its compliance
program."); See How to Comply With the Law, AUSTRALIAN LAW NEWS No. 5, at 20 (June
1991) ("Professor Steinberg said [that while] the [compliance] program should be effectively
administered ... the company should not adopt any nonessential aspect of a prospective pro-
gram that it could not feasibly implement.").
66. See Michael Goldblatt, Corporate Compliance: Institutionalizing Compliance with
Company- Wide Training Programs, 6 Insights, No. 1, at 22 (Jan. 1992); Pitt & Groskaufmanis,
supra note 62, at 1643-45.
67. See, e.g., discussion infra notes 132-46 and accompanying text.
68. See ABA Report, supra note 43, at 239-40 (surveying various international, national,
and regional law firms and finding that at least 33 of the 40 firms surveyed had policies in
effect).
69. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(0, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(a) (1988) (imposing duty on broker-dealers
and investment advisors to maintain written policies and procedures).
70. See, e.g., SEC v. Lerner, David, Littenberg and Samuel, SEC. Lit. Rel. No. 9049, 19
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Although this position is debatable, 71 law and accounting firms are prescrib-
ing procedures in the face of SEC warnings, 72 liability exposure under
ITSFEA,7 3 and the large number of law firms implicated in insider trading
scandals. 74 Indeed, in view that the adoption of a law compliance program
directed against insider trading is standard fare for sophisticated accounting
and law firms engaged in the representation of publicly-held enterprises,
those firms that decline to have such a program in place may be viewed as
recklessly disregarding the fact that a person it controls is likely to engage in
such a violation.7 5 This risk of liability exposure is not confined to the firm
itself but extends to controlling persons of the organization, hence encom-
passing senior partners of law and accounting firms and others with supervi-
sory responsibility. 76
SEC Docket (CCH) 1153 (D.D.C. 1980) (Commission asserts that law firms have duty to
adopt, implement and enforce procedures designed to protect client information); Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 13437, 11 SEC Docket (CCH) 2231, 2231 (1977) ("Law firms, like
others which have confidential information in their possession that may affect the securities
trading markets, have an affirmative obligation to safeguard such information."); Philip R.
Lochner, Jr., Lawyers and Insider Trading, 11 Bus. LAW. UPDATE No. 5, at 1, 14 (May/June
1991) (arguing that "ITSFEA can be viewed as imposing an affirmative obligation on law firms
to take appropriate action to prevent insider trading"); SEC Finding Law Firms Lack Safe-
guards to Deter Insider Trading, Breeden Says, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1378 (1990); see
also Peter M.O. Wong, Note, Insider Trading Regulation of Law Firms: Expanding ITSFEA 's
Policy and Procedures Requirement, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1159, 1182-83 (1993) (proposing that
"Congress amend ITSFEA to include lawyers and law firms with broker-dealers and invest-
ment advisers under ITSFEA's requirement to establish, maintain, and enforce policies and
procedures aimed at preventing insider trading").
71. See ABA Report, supra note 43, at 239 & n.5 (stating that "no court has held that law
firms must have in place a formal statement of policy or procedures in order to avoid vicarious
liability for the errant acts of misguided employees or members").
72. See sources cited supra note 70.
73. See supra notes 23-39 and accompanying text.
74. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 115; Theodore A. Levine & Arthur F. Mathews, Law
Firm Policies and Procedures to Prevent Insider Trading Abuses, 21 Ann. Inst. on Sec. Reg.
395, 411-24 (1989) (reviewing several insider trading cases involving lawyers or law firm per-
sonnel). These cases include United States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1988) and SEC
v. O'Hagen, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,852 (D. Minn. 1989).
75. See 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT
& PREVENTION § 12.03[3], at 12-27, 12-28 (1993) (stating that after the passage of ITSFEA,
"potential law firm liability ... [for] failure to supervise or control is a serious possibility");
Jonathan Eisenberg, Law Firms Beware! Recent Insider Trading Legislation Affects You Too,
WASH. LAW., at 38, 40 (Nov./Dec. 1989) (asserting that a law firm's "failure to adopt policies
and procedures may itself evidence recklessness"); Requirements of Insider Trading Act Go
Beyond Securities Firms, Lynch Says, 21 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 65 (1989) (former SEC
Enforcement Director opining that "there could be a case where the mere fact that a firm
failed to establish any policies and procedures whatsoever would be deemed to be reckless
conduct"); discussion supra note 28 and accompanying text; infra notes 307-14 and accompa-
nying text.
76. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 114 (stating that "not only the law firm but partners and
individuals with supervisory responsibility over the firm's operations or the violator can be
subject to the controlling person penalties provided for in ITSFEA"); Wong, supra note 70, at
1166 (pointing out that "senior members of law firms may be subject to liability under IT-
SFEA, but may not realize that they are considered a controlling person").
An even broader argument can be set forth in this context: namely, that conduct by a profes-
sional firm that slights the adoption and implementation of a reasonably effective law compli-
ance program may fail to adhere to professional norms, hence constituting evidence of
negligence. See generally Steinberg, supra note 45, at 27 ("The standard against which an
attorney's conduct is measured is the degree of care that is usual and customary practice of
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On another level, professional firms have reasons to consider adopting
procedures irrespective of potential liability under the applicable laws. Law-
yers should abide by the ethical and professional rules of conduct adopted by
their state and local bar associations. 77 Furthermore, law and accounting
firms, like all professional organizations, desire to protect their reputations
from insider trading scandals involving members or employees. 78
B. SPECIFIC POLICIES AND PROCEDURES THAT LAW AND ACCOUNTING
FIRMS MAY ADOPT
Based on the liability framework for controlling persons introduced under
ITSFEA, it would be prudent for professional firms, that represent publicly-
held enterprises or otherwise that are privy to inside information, to adopt
education policies that cover not only ethical rules but also legal prohibitions
concerning insider trading. Specifically, such firms should have a basic pol-
icy designed to educate their personnel about the laws on insider trading, the
ethical rules on confidentiality, and the attendant risks of noncompliance. 79
The primary issue with law and accounting firms should be whether to
adopt policies and procedures that go beyond a basic education policy and
include preventive measures. The size of a firm is an important considera-
tion, but the most relevant factor is the nature of the firm's practice.80
For instance, many law firms that represent publicly-held companies have
instituted pre-clearance procedures for trading by their personnel in client
securities. 81 Moreover, firms whose practices focus principally on their cli-
ents' compliance with Exchange Act reporting requirements should ascer-
tain whether more detailed procedures would be prudent. And, as a
lawyers under similar circumstances."), citing, O'Neil v. Bergan, 452 A.2d 337 (D.C. App.
1982); Sommerfeldt v. Trammel, 74 Or. App. 183, 702 P.2d 430 (1985).
77. Levine & Mathews, supra note 74, at 398-400; Wong, supra note 70, at 1178-81. The
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct contain at least three provisions that impact on
insider trading. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1994) (with certain
exceptions, broad duty to maintain client confidences obtained during the course of represent-
ing a client, regardless of the source of the information); id. Rule 1.8(b) (providing that "[a]
lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the
client unless the client consents after consultation"); id. Rule 5.3 and comment (responsibilities
regarding nonlawyer assistants include giving "appropriate instruction and supervision regard-
ing the ethical aspects of their employment, particularly concerning the obligation not to dis-
close information relating to representation of the client").
78. See Stephen R. Volk et al., Law Firm Policies and Procedures in an Era of Increasing
Responsibilities: Analysis of a Survey of Law Firms, 48 Bus. LAW. 1567, 1568 (1993); see also
Levine & Mathews, supra note 74, at 398-400. But see Helen A. Garten, Insider Trading in
the Corporate Interest, 1987 WIs. L. REV. 573, 594 (asserting that "if professional firms...
serve as sources of valuable information, then dealing in information, even inside information,
may further the goals of the firm by enhancing its reputation for knowledge and expertise").
79. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 115 (recommending the minimum elements of an insider
trading policy for a law firm); see also Steinberg, supra note 45, at 93 ("Given the extent of
insider trading that has been engaged in by law firm personnel, it would be prudent for law
firms to adopt and enforce formal insider trading policies."); Jonathan Eisenberg, Protecting
Against Insider Trading Liability, 22 Rev. Sec. & Comm. Reg. 87 (1989); Herbert S. Wander,
Insider Trading: How Law Firms Can Protect Themselves, 1 Insights No. 2, at 9 (Aug. 1987).
80. See ABA Report, supra note 43, at 240 n. 11 (listing some factors to consider when
adopting a policy); Phillips, supra note 2, at 115 (same); supra note 42 and accompanying text.
81. See ABA Report, supra note 43, at 248-51.
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generality, corporate practices that frequently involve mergers, acquisitions,
and tender offer [hereinafter M&A] work have the greatest need for exten-
sive procedures.8 2
Furthermore, a professional firm that performs no corporate or securities
work should not necessarily assume that adoption of a basic education policy
as the sole ingredient of its law compliance program is a sufficient safeguard.
For example, the Commission's first insider trading suit against a law firm,
SEC v. Lerner,8 3 involved a small firm whose practice focused almost exclu-
sively on patent work. In that case, the lawyers purchased securities of a
client based on nonpublic information about the disposition of the client's
patent application.8 4 Likewise, firms with only litigation practices may face
risks.85 The point is that, irrespective of the specialties practiced, a firm
should not overlook the prospect of obtaining inside information in the rep-
resentation of publicly-held clients.
The remainder of this section addresses policies and procedures that have
frequently been employed by law firms.
1. Education Policies
The basic education policies outlined above with respect to the prohibi-
tions against insider trading86 are equally suited for law firm personnel. One
variation is to tailor the examples of insider trading to the situations most
likely to arise in the course of each firm's practice.8 7 One important differ-
ence for law firms, however, is that their education policies also should ad-
dress the additional prohibitions imposed by state bar rules on professional
conduct. 88
In this regard, the policy should include a definition of "client confi-
dences." This term covers a broad range of material: any information that
law firm personnel obtain in the course of the firm's representation of a client
(irrespective of whether such information comes within the attorney-client
82. Firms with practices focusing on Exchange Act reporting requirements frequently en-
counter information regarding such matters as corporate earnings, changes in management,
and major accounting write-offs that affect the price of client securities. See Phillips, supra
note 2, at 116. See also ABA Report, supra note 43, at 243-44. Even if a firm's corporate
practice involves only privately-held companies, insider trading concerns could arise if one of
its clients obtained a major new contract at the expense of a publicly-held rival. See ABA
Report, supra note 43, at 248-50. With respect to firms specializing in M&A practices, see
Michele Galen, Insider-Trading Probes Raise Alarm: Security More Crucial Than Ever, NAT'L
L.J., June 30, 1986, at 1 (discussing difficulty of law firms specializing in M&A work to pre-
vent trading and tipping by their personnel).
83. SEC v. Lerner, David, Littenberg, and Samuel, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 9049, 19 SEC
Docket (CCH) 1153 (D.D.C. 1980).
84. Id.; see Levine & Mathews, supra note 74, at 403.
85. Some examples include prospective bankruptcy petitions for a publicly-held company
or contemplated litigation against a publicly-held company. See ABA Report, supra note 43,
at 243-44.
86. See supra notes 45-67 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., ABA Report, supra note 43, at 243 (providing examples relating to material
information).
88. Id. at 258-61 (providing examples of law firm policies on insider trading that include
separate discussions of ethical rules on confidentiality).
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privilege). 9 Of course, such information is not limited to information that
could potentially affect the price of publicly-traded securities. 90 As a matter
of practice, law firm personnel should assume that any information obtained
at work regarding a client is confidential. 91
The policy should adopt a general prohibition on discussing client confi-
dences outside of work, with an emphasis on communications to spouses,
relatives, and friends. It should direct personnel to discuss confidences only
on a "need-to-know" basis. 92 Finally, the policy should warn personnel
never to use client confidences for their personal advantage, which is not
necessarily limited to trading in securities. 9 3
2. Procedures and Policies to Detect and Prevent Abuses
The following is a discussion of some of the devices that law firms have
adopted to prevent and detect insider trading by their personnel. Due to the
administrative overhead that these measures entail, only firms with substan-
tial insider trading risks may consider adopting them. These procedures
should be generally applicable to accounting firms as well.
a. Pre-Clearance of Securities Transactions
Many law firms have adopted procedures that require all members and
employees to obtain approval before they (or their spouse or minor children)
can execute transactions in client securities. 94 To implement the policy,
firms assign a billing or other responsible partner to screen the trades to
affirm that the firm does not possess any material, nonpublic information
affecting the securities. 95 Such pre-clearance policies vary in scope from
screening trades only in client securities 96 to trades in any publicly-traded
89. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (rule on confidentiality). Hence,
"the confidentiality rule embraces not only communications within the ambit of the attorney-
client privilege, but extends 'to all information relating to the representation, whatever its
source.'" Steinberg, supra note 45, at 162, quoting, Model Rule 1.6 comment. See generally
G. HAZARD & W. HODEs, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 102-06 (1985); C. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS 670 (1986); James P. Hemmer, Resignation of Corporate Counsel: Fulfillment
or Abdication of Duty, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 641 (1988); Simon M. Lorne, The Corporate and
Securities Advisor, The Public Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 MIcH. L. REV. 425 (1978);
Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Liability for Client Fraud, 1991 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1; Robert J.
Wilczek, Corporate Confidentiality: Problems and Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 7 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 221 (1982).
90. See Rule 1.6 (comment). See also Phillips, supra note 2, at 115 (discussing policy
statements on confidentiality).
91. See ABA Report, supra note 43, at 259-61.
92. Id. at 258-65.
93. Id. See Levine & Mathews, supra note 74, at 404-07; Phillips, supra note 2, at 116.
94. See ABA Report, supra note 43, at 249 (applying pre-clearance policy to an attorney
or employee's "spouse or minor children, or any accounts or entities over which he or she or
members of his or her family have investment discretion or influence").
95. Phillips, supra note 2, at 116 (stating that such a pre-clearance policy "is workable
only if billing and responsible partners accept the obligation to respond promptly to such
inquiries").
96. Id. (stating that "[a] pre-clearance policy for trades in client securities would seem
relatively easy to implement, since personnel generally are in a position to check the client list
prior to trading and obtain clearance from the billing or responsible partner").
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securities. 97 Use of a "restricted list ' ' 98 also is employed by a number of
firms that require pre-clearance of securities transactions, particularly those
with M&A practices.99 Once a trade is approved, the procedures usually
limit the duration of the approval's effectiveness. 100 Law firm policies usu-
ally exempt certain instruments, such as interests in open-end, publicly-
traded mutual funds, from the pre-screening and other detection procedures
that otherwise would be employed.101
b. Prohibitions and Limitations on Types of Trading
Law firms often supplement pre-screening mechanisms with prohibitions
on certain transactions that involve a greater risk of speculative activity.
These prohibitions typically cover any form of short sales. 10 2 Option trans-
actions also frequently face restrictions, such as bans on option transactions
in client securities or a requirement that all option transactions be pre-
screened. 103 Finally, some firms prohibit short-term trading of client securi-
ties by requiring that all such securities be held by firm personnel for a mini-
mum six-month period. 1 4
c. Reporting of Security Holdings
A law or accounting firm that adopts any of the preceding devices for pre-
screening trades or prohibiting certain types of transactions also may con-
sider whether its personnel should report their holdings of publicly-traded
securities to the responsible firm source charged with this function. 10 5 Such
a reporting procedure may provide an effective reminder of the insider trad-
97. See ABA Report, supra note 43, at 248-55. Another example is to provide "for pre-
clearance of client transactions and transactions in companies involved in matters on which
the employee has worked within the preceding six months." Id. at 249.
98. ABA Report, supra note 43, at 251. Since restricted lists are used to a greater extent
by broker-dealers, a more detailed discussion of them is provided in the next section. See infra
notes 132-204 and accompanying text.
99. See ABA Report, supra note 43, at 251-52; Phillips, supra note 2, at 116. Restricted
lists in the law firm setting generally identify publicly-traded client securities with respect to
which law firm personnel are likely to have material inside information on a regular basis and
publicly-traded securities of non-clients where law firm personnel currently have material in-
side information due to the firm's involvement in a specific transaction, such as a tender offer
or merger. ABA Report, supra note 43, at 252. As noted by one authority, effective imple-
mentation of pre-clearance procedures, including use of a restricted list, can be "exceedingly
difficult" for a firm whose attorneys are engaged in diversified practices. This is due to the
attorneys' lack of sensitivity in this setting and their failure to report inside information to the
firm's central clearing facility. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 116.
100. See ABA Report, supra note 43, at 250-51 (providing examples of policies that limit
the duration to the day of the approval, twenty-four hours, and five business days).
101. Id. at 252-53 (providing examples of exempt transactions: interests in mutual funds
(except those with a specific policy to invest in possible takeover situations), United States
government securities, stock in a closely held company having no public market, among
others).
102. See ABA Report, supra note 43, at 255; Phillips supra note 2, at 116.
103. See ABA Report, supra note 43, at 254-55.
104. See id. at 254; Phillips, supra note 2, at 116. Some firms, although not prohibiting the
activity, "discourage" short-term trading of client securities. See ABA Report, supra note 43,
at 254.
105. These holdings may be reported annually with the firm and when there is a change in
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ing policy to a firm's personnel and may serve as a useful tool for determin-
ing compliance with the firm's trading policies.' 0 6 Nonetheless, a major
drawback is that accounting and law firm personnel may perceive such a
reporting system as an unwarranted invasion of privacy. Moreover, if effec-
tively implemented, an elaborate reporting system may be unduly costly and
time-consuming to administer. Even more troubling, perhaps, is that, once
adopted, failure to implement such a reporting system effectively may expose
the firm to liability exposure under ITSFEA as well as other statutes. Given
these drawbacks, few firms have opted for a reporting mechanism. 0 7
3. Mechanisms to Limit Access to and Prevent Disclosure of Material
Nonpublic Information
Law and accounting firms frequently employ mechanisms to protect the
confidentiality of client matters. These policies should instruct all members
and personnel on the proper methods for the handling and safekeeping of
sensitive files, letters, documents, and other such memoranda.108 Confiden-
tial matters are not to be discussed in public places, including elevators,
taxis, airplanes, and restaurants.' 0 9 Another important area is to provide
guidance on communicating with persons outside of the firm. A common
policy is to instruct secretaries never to disclose an attorney's location
outside of the office, such as at a client's office, to outside callers." 0 For
highly sensitive matters like merger and acquisition transactions, some firms
use code names in documents to disguise the identities of clients and other
parties. " '
Finally, policies should focus on security concerns relating to the use of
computers. These policies address the protection of "log-in" IDs and pass-
words from disclosure outside the firm and instruct personnel never to leave
a terminal unattended for extended periods if it is "logged-in."" 12 Given the
high stakes, it would be prudent for firms to adopt and implement effectively
the foregoing practices aimed at preserving confidentiality.
V. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
As compared to professional firms and publicly-held companies, financial
one's holdings. A determination also must be made whether to limit such a reporting proce-
dure to client securities.
106. A requirement mandating the reporting of security holdings is commonplace in the
broker-dealer industry. See infra notes 248-54 and accompanying text.
107. See ABA Report, supra note 43, at 255-58; Phillips, supra note 2, at 116.
108. See ABA Report, supra note 43, at 261-65 (providing examples of such policies to
include: instructions not to leave sensitive documents and other materials lying exposed on
desk; clear conference rooms when absent; shred sensitive documents before disposal).
109. Id. at 263.
110. Id. at 263-65. For example, law firm policies instruct secretaries never to send docu-
ments to persons unless they have been authorized for receipt by an attorney in the firm. In
regard to visitors, they should always be attended and should not be allowed to wander
through the firm's offices. Visitors should be escorted to and from the reception area and
directed to specified locations for phone calls. Id.
11. See Levine & Mathews, supra note 74, at 410.
112. See ABA Report, supra note 43, at 265.
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intermediaries have the greatest need for effective insider trading procedures.
The numerous functions that broker-dealers, investment advisors, invest-
ment companies and banks perform for the investment community create
substantial insider trading risks.' 13 For instance, one department within an
institution might obtain inside information on a publicly-held issuer when
assisting with the issuer's capital financing needs; at the same time, a differ-
ent department could be recommending and executing trades in the issuer's
securities for the accounts of its customers.1 14
Congress has recognized the enhanced risks of insider trading in the finan-
cial intermediary context by imposing an affirmative obligation on broker-
dealers and investment advisors to establish and maintain effective proce-
dures that are reasonably designed to prevent insider trading abuses by their
employees or associated persons.' 15 While ITSFEA did not impose this
duty on investment companies, many have adopted such policies in view of
the "tenor" of the statute and the existence of Section 17(j) of the Invest-
ment Company Act 116 and rule 17j- 1117 thereunder. 18 Federal regulators of
the banking industry also have adopted positions that require national banks
to implement written procedures reasonably designed to prevent insider
trading.' 19
This section begins with a brief review of the various functions that bro-
ker-dealers, investment advisors, investment companies, and banks perform
and a discussion of the attendant insider trading risks in each context. It
then reviews the use of Chinese Walls by financial intermediaries to address
these risks and the legal sufficiency of such mechanisms. Last, this section
113. See, e.g., Ross Cranston, Conflicts of Interest in the Multifunctional Financial Institu-
tion, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990); James R. Doty & David N. Powers, Chinese Walls: The
Transformation of a Good Business Practice, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 155 (1988); Levine et al.,
supra note 2.
114. See Martin Lipton & Robert B. Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflict
Problems of Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 459, 460-61 (1975). Other examples are
provided by Levine et al., supra note 2, at 44:
At the same time that the investment banking department of a firm is providing
confidential counseling [such as to the bidder or target in the takeover setting
prior to public announcement of the bid], its research department may be pre-
paring investment advice for brokerage or investment advisory clients concern-
ing companies affected by the tender offer. If the firm has a retail brokerage
facility, the firm's salesmen may be recommending purchases or sales of the
stock of one or more of the affected companies. In addition, the firm may be
buying and selling the securities of the affected companies. These purchases or
sales may be made in the firm's capacity as market maker, for the firm's own
proprietary accounts, or on behalf of institutions or individuals for which it
manages investment portfolios.
115. Section 15(f) of Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 780(0 (1988); Section 204A of Investment
Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (1988); see also discussion supra notes 28-39 and
accompanying text.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(j) (1988).
117. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1 (1994); see infra notes 194-204 and accompanying text.
118. See Harvey L. Pitt & Dixie L. Johnson, A Renewed Emphasis on "Chinese Walls"for
Investment Advisers and Investment Companies, 6 INSIGHTs No. 11, at 19, 20 (Nov. 1992).
119. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Policy Statement Concerning Use
of Inside Information, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,755 (Mar. 17, 1978) [hereinafter Federal Reserve Pol-
icy]; 43 Fed. Reg. 6759 (Feb. 16, 1978) (Comptroller of the Currency, Dept. of Treasury,
adopting amendment to 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d) (1994), effective Mar. 20, 1978).
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reviews the elements of insider trading policies and procedures in the broker-
dealer context.
A. BROKER-DEALERS, INVESTMENT ADVISORS, INVESTMENT
COMPANIES, AND BANKS
Broker-dealers perform various functions including investment banking,
brokerage activities, underwriting, research, investment advice, and invest-
ment management. 120 Potential conflicts can arise when information gather-
ing and investment decision functions affect the same issuer. The investment
banking department could obtain material, nonpublic information on a pub-
licly-held issuer while the brokerage section is recommending trades in the
same issuer's securities or while the trading department is executing trades
in the issuer's securities for the firm's own proprietary accounts or as a mar-
ket maker. 121
For several years, the SEC has focused on the potential for insider trading
by investment companies and advisors. 122 This concern coincides with the
increasing number of investment companies in the United States and the
expanding amount of assets under their control. 123 Investment advisors and
managers of investment companies can obtain inside information on portfo-
lio securities by use of their positions and potentially enrich themselves by
trading in those securities at the expense of their respective companies and
the investing public.' 24 Furthermore, investment companies are pursuing a
broader range of securities for their portfolios, thus raising enhanced insider
trading concerns. For instance, some investment company funds seek dis-
tressed securities of troubled or bankrupt companies. 125 The investment
company's large holdings of such securities may cause it to be a member of
the bankrupt company's creditors' committee, where the fund manager may
be exposed to material, nonpublic information about the issuer. 126
120. See Levine et al., supra note 2, at 43-44; Lipton & Mazur, supra note 114, at 460.
121. See Levine et al., supra note 2, at 43-44; Lipton & Mazur, supra note 114, at 464-65;
supra note 114.
122. See Pitt & Johnson, supra note 118, at 19-20. Investment companies provide a vehicle
through which members of the general public can invest funds in a company that itself is
engaged in investing and trading in securities. See generally TAMAR FRANKEL, THE REGULA-
TION OF MONEY MANAGERS (1978).
123. Pitt & Johnson, supra note 118, at 20 (citing statistics showing that more than 3,500
investment companies operate in the United States, controlling more than $1.5 trillion in assets
for more than 68 million accounts).
124. See Frankel, supra note 122, at 565; Jonathan Clements, Personal Trading Is Common
Among Fund Managers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1994, at C1 ("As the ethics of personal stock
trades stir up a ruckus in the mutual fund industry, one thing is becoming clear: personal
trading by fund managers is widespread and sometimes feverish.").
125. Ron Suskind, Delicate Situation: Mutual Fund Has Brokerage-Firm Link That Inter-
ests the SEC, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1993, at AI (discussing potential insider trading conflicts at
one investment company whose investment strategy seeks "out-of-favor or ailing companies
with hidden potential").
126. Pitt & Johnson, supra note 118, at 20 (citing In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., No. 1-
90-00130 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio, Mar. 7, 1991) as an example). The investment company can find
itself in a "Catch-22" type situation: the fund manager may have a duty to join the creditors'
committee to protect the shareholders' investment, but the position may provide access to
inside information that may preclude further trading. Id.; see also Ralph C. Ferrara & Herbert
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Commercial banks are another example of financial institutions whose
multiple roles can create insider trading and conflict of interest risks. A
large commercial bank frequently obtains confidential information during
the negotiation of a loan with an issuer of publicly-traded securities. At the
same time, the bank's trust department may be effecting or recommending
transactions in the issuer's securities for customer accounts. 127 Banks thus
utilize procedures to prevent confidential information obtained from a cus-
tomer in the commercial department from being disclosed to personnel en-
gaged in investment decisions in the trust department. 28
Commercial banks also can acquire confidential information relating to
publicly-traded securities through the performance of other functions.
Three examples are provided. First, large banks often have municipal bond
departments that underwrite municipal securities, which are traded in public
secondary markets.129 Second, at times, banks are involved as advisors to
issuers of publicly-traded securities in the private placement of their securi-
ties.' 30 And third, banks frequently perform an important role in the financ-
ing of tender offers for publicly-held enterprises.13 1
B. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF CHINESE WALLS
1. Introduction to Chinese Walls
Chinese Wall procedures consist of policies and procedures designed to
control the flow of material, nonpublic information within a multiservice
C. Thomas, Creditors' Committees and Research Departments: Chinese Walls and Related
Compliance Issues, Twenty-Fifth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation 163 (1993); Rob-
ert C. Pozen & Judy K. Mencher, Chinese Walls for Creditors' Committees, 48 Bus. LAW. 747
(1993) (discussing the use of Chinese Walls by institutional investors who sit on reorganization
committees of issuers).
127. See Stephen T. Greenberg et al., The Obligations of Banks in the Public Securities
Markets, 1980 DUKE L.J. 1063, 1080.
128. See infra notes 205-13 and accompanying text. See generally Federal Reserve Policy,
supra note 119 (viewing a bank's decision or recommendation to purchase or sell any securities
on the basis of material, nonpublic information as an unsound and unsafe banking practice and
recommending that national banks adopt written policies and procedures to ensure that trust
departments do not misuse such information); Leo Herzel & Dale E. Coiling, The Chinese
Wall Revisited, 6 CORP. L. REV. 116 (1983) (arguing that banks can use Chinese Walls to
resolve issues relating to insider trading and other conflict of interest problems that arise in the
commercial bank setting).
129. Herzel & Coiling, supra note 128, at 117 n.2.
130. Id.
131. See MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES
§ 11.02, at 11-4.3 (1994) ("In regard to banks, the situation usually arises when the lender,
having obtained material, nonpublic information about a company in the course of a commer-
cial relationship with that subject company, subsequently is approached by a bidder to finance
a cash tender offer for the target company."); Edward D. Herlihy et al., Supervisory and Com-
pliance Policies and Procedures Under the New Insider Trading Act, 3 INSIGHTS, No. 4, at 3, 11
(Apr. 1989).
For cases addressing the potential conflicts that a commercial bank may have in connection
with financing the bidder's acquisition, see Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594
(3d Cir. 1979); American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 475 F.
Supp. 5 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,286 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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financial firm. 132 In the broker-dealer context, a Chinese Wall isolates the
investment banking department from the brokerage, research, and other de-
partments and also limits the flow of sensitive information on a need-to-
know basis.1 33 In the case of banks, the Chinese Wall segregates the trust
department from the commercial lending, as well as the government and
municipal securities underwriting departments.' 34
Although Chinese Wall policies and procedures differ among firms, insti-
tutions employ numerous such practices to control the flow of information
between departments. 35 In addition to general written policies and educa-
tional programs, consideration should be given to the implementation of
procedures such as the following: (i) physical separation of departments in
different wings or floors of a building; (ii) maintenance of separate account-
ing systems, records, and support staff; (iii) clearly identifying sensitive doc-
uments, employing secure filing systems, and restricting access by persons in
departments where a breach of confidentiality could occur, such as a bank's
trust department or a broker-dealer's trading section; (iv) limiting attend-
ance at meetings where sensitive topics will be discussed; (v) restricting the
transfer of personnel from one department into another; (vi) restricting di-
rectors, officers and employees from serving dual roles in more than one
market sensitive area, such as the arbitrage and underwriting sections of a
broker-dealer; and (vii) using code names in documents to conceal the iden-
tity of issuers.136
Generally, these policies and procedures focus on the activities of the sec-
tions of a firm that will frequently come into possession of material, nonpub-
lic information, such as the investment banking section of a broker-dealer.
At times, persons in other departments must be consulted on sensitive mat-
ters, such as when an opinion must be obtained from an analyst in the re-
search department. In these instances, the research analyst would be
"brought over the wall": the analyst would be required to operate under the
same procedures that limit the investment banking section.' 37
132. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17120, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 82,646, at 83,461 (1980) [hereinafter Rule 14e-3 Release] (SEC Release adopting
Rule 14e-3 which discusses the use of Chinese Walls in the tender offer context).
133. See In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 43 S.E.C. 933, [1967-1969 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,629 (1968) (Exhibit A) (providing example of Chinese
Wall policy that Merrill Lynch agreed to employ in a settlement of charges of violating the
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws).
134. Federal Reserve Policy, supra note 119, at 12,756.
135. See SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,620-80,625.
136. See Federal Reserve Policy, supra note 119, at 12,756; Doty & Powers, supra note 113,
at 175-77 (recommending ten procedures to be considered when developing Chinese Wall pro-
cedures for a multiservice securities firm).
137. See Doty & Powers, supra note 113, at 175-77. As set forth in a 1993 SEC staff report:
If, in the process of developing a nonpublic underwriting transaction, a firm's
investment banking personnel determine that the views of a particular research
analyst would greatly assist the structuring of the potential underwriting, the
research analyst may be informed of the nonpublic underwriting effort and
"brought over the wall" to assist the investment banking team. The research
analyst would then be informed that he or she must maintain the confidentiality
of this transaction and that certain limitations will be imposed on the analyst's
activities until the transaction becomes public. For example, the analyst might
[Vol. 471804
INSIDER TRADING COMPLIANCE
2 The Need for Reinforcement Measures
In addition to the information segregation measures outlined above, the
SEC and commentators have focused on the need for financial in-
termediaries to maintain reinforcement mechanisms. These other proce-
dures, primarily restricted and watch lists, frequently are employed by
multiservice financial firms to cope with their conflicting duties and avert the
imposition of liability. 138 Internal audits and other enforcement measures
are also utilized to ensure compliance and to detect breaches of the wall. 139
When personnel are brought over the wall, they become subject to these
reinforcement procedures as well.140
To prevent leaks of inside information, the implementation by multiser-
vice financial firms of reinforcement measures are key components of an ef-
fective compliance program. 141 Thus, the Commission often describes
adequate procedures for financial intermediaries to include Chinese
Walls, 14 2 restricted lists, 143 watch lists, 44 and other procedures145 designed
be prohibited from issuing research reports concerning this issuer until compli-
ance or legal staff notifies the analyst that the limitations have been lifted.
Broker-Dealer Internal Control Procedures for High Yield Securities, Report by the Division
of Market Regulation, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,251, at 84,680
n.17 (Oct. 1993) [hereinafter Commission Division Report]; see also infra notes 233-39 and
accompanying text.
138. See Rule 14e-3 Release, supra note 132, at 83,461; Levine et al., supra note 2, at 58.
139. See Doty & Powers, supra note 113, at 175-77.
140. See id. at 177 (including restricted lists, limits on employee securities transactions, and
internal audits).
141. See Commission Division Report, supra note 137, at 84,679-84,683; SEC Division
Report, supra note 64, at 80,623-80,625; Rule 14e-3 Release, supra note 132, at 83,461.
142. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text; see also Lipton & Mazur, supra note
114, at 459. Herlihy et al., supra note 131, at 8; Levine et al., supra note 2, at 58.
143. Commission Division Report, supra note 137, at 84,680 n.15.
When an investment banking transaction becomes "public" (through a filing
with the Commission or otherwise), firms will add the issuer's securities to a
"restricted" list accessible to personnel throughout the firm. Once this is done,
most, if not all, trading by proprietary and employee accounts is prohibited for
set time periods. In addition, other firm activities, such as the issuance of re-
search recommendations concerning the issuer's securities, also are severely lim-
ited or prohibited for set periods. Because the effects of such restrictions are so
wide-ranging, securities are not added to the list until deals are made public.
Otherwise, adding a security to this list might send a signal both within and
outside the firm that a nonpublic transaction is imminent.
Id.
144. Id. at 84,680 n.14.
At most firms, the compliance or legal staff maintains a "watch" or "grey" list
of securities. A security is added to this list whenever an investment banking
engagement is entered into between the broker-dealer and the security's issuer -
or in any other instance in which one part of the broker-dealer has received
material, nonpublic information concerning the issuer. The compliance or legal
staff uses this list to monitor the firm's activities. For example, if a firm em-
ployee buys or sells a security on this list, the compliance or legal staff needs to
determine if this transaction is indicative of a "breach" of Chinese Wall
procedures.
Id.
145. Id. at 84,680 n.16.
Many firms have implemented a third type of list for use after a security is added
to the watch or grey list but before the security has been added to the restricted
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to prevent violations of the federal securities laws. 146
3. Judicial and Administrative Treatment of Chinese Walls
This section reviews the judicial decisions and administrative actions that
have addressed the legal sufficiency of Chinese Walls (and reinforcement
procedures). The section first surveys the cases that have discussed whether
Chinese Walls enable multiservice financial firms to resolve their potentially
conflicting duties. Thereafter, the section reviews the regulatory endorse-
ment of Chinese Walls by the Commission in its adoption of rules 14e-3 and
17j-1, by the regulators of the banking industry, and by the self-regulatory
organizations (SROs) that monitor the securities markets.
a. Cases Addressing Chinese Walls
The Commission's first indication that Chinese Wall procedures might
constitute an adequate mechanism came in the context of a rule lOb-5 action
in In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 147 In that case, Merrill
Lynch, as managing underwriter of a securities offering for Douglas Aircraft
Co., Inc., learned material, confidential information about its client's recent
earnings. This information was transmitted to a number of the firm's bro-
kers who selectively disclosed such information to institutional investors
who in turn sold Douglas securities through accounts with Merrill Lynch.
In its settlement with the SEC, Merrill Lynch agreed to institute Chinese
Wall procedures to help ensure that information from its underwriting group
would not be available to anyone outside the group except for certain senior
executives and others who had a need to know. 148
The Merrill Lynch policy was basically an education policy. It defined the
term "material information" and instructed all personnel not to disclose
such information. 149 The policy was to be widely distributed' 50 and im-
posed a duty on department managers to review the policy with their person-
list. If compliance or legal personnel determines that the firm's or employees'
activities should in some way be limited, the security is placed on this list. For
example, just prior to the public announcement of an investment banking trans-
action, the compliance or legal staff may instruct the firm's market makers to
trade the issuer's securities in a "passive" manner, (i.e., by executing only unso-
licited customer trades).
Id.
146. See Rule 14e-3 Release, supra note 132, at 83,461. See generally Bromberg & Lowen-
fels, supra note 7, § 7.4(633); Langevoort, supra note 75, § 12.02.
147. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8459, 43 SEC 933, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,629 (Nov. 25, 1968); see also In re Investor's Management Co.,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (July 29, 1971) (suggesting that insider trading is
actionable irrespective of presence of Chinese Wall).
148. Id. at 83,350; see also Levine et al., supra note 2, at 61; Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra
note 62, at 1618.
149. In re Merrill Lynch, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,629,
at 83,351 (Exhibit A).
150. Id. The policy was to be distributed to senior management, division and department
managers, office managers, members of the underwriting divisions, research analysts, and ac-
count executives and was to be included in the firm's operations manual.
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nel on a periodic basis.151 Otherwise, no reinforcement procedures such as
restricted lists were discussed. 152 Given the limited extent of the policy, it
was not surprising that the Commission stated that it could not determine if
the procedures would be adequate in all circumstances and cautioned that
"[s]tringent measures [would] be required in order to avoid future
violations." 153
The Commission returned to this issue in its amicus curiae brief in Slade v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co. ' 54 In this case the SEC made clear that it favored
policies and procedures that prevented the transmission of material, nonpub-
lic information among firm personnel engaged in brokerage and trading ac-
tivities. 155 Slade involved brokerage customers of Shearson who claimed
that the firm had continued to recommend the purchase of stock in a client's
securities after the firm's investment banking department had obtained ad-
verse material information during the course of providing services to that
client. 156
The district court denied Shearson's motion for summary judgment in
which Shearson argued that it was precluded from revealing the adverse in-
formation to its brokerage customers. Although the court agreed that "an
investment banker may not reveal inside information obtained pursuant to a
confidential investment banking relationship to its retail customers through
its brokerage organization,"' 1 7 the court concluded that Shearson could
have used the information to prevent its brokers from soliciting trades on the
basis of information which the firm knew was false or misleading. 158 The
court rejected Shearson's argument that any use of the inside information,
such as developing a no-recommendation policy for the subject company,
would have violated its fiduciary duty to the investment banking client. 159
Subsequently, a controlling question of law in Slade was certified for re-
151. Id. The policy allowed disclosure to the following groups: (i) senior executives of
Merrill Lynch; (ii) its legal department; (iii) personnel directly involved in an underwriting
effort, such as lawyers and accountants; (iv) research personnel consulted in connection with
an offering; and (v) members of buying departments of prospective co-underwriters so that
they may decide whether to participate in an offering. Id. at 83,351 (Exhibit A).
152. See id. at 83,350-83,351; supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
153. In re Merrill Lynch, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,629,
at 83,350; see Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 62, at 1618 (stating that "the Chinese Wall
[in the Merrill Lynch proceeding] thus made its securities law debut with a tepid showing of
support"); Norman S. Poser, Chinese Wall or Emperor's New Clothes? Regulating Conflicts of
Interest of Securities Firms in the U.S. and the U.K., 9 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 91, 106
(1988) (commenting that the SEC's settlement order with Merrill Lynch conveyed not "even a
hint that the Commission intended the Chinese Wall to have any legal effect") (emphasis in
original).
154. 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974).
155. See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, amicus curiae, at 8, Slade v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974); Levine et al., supra note 2, at 61.
156. See Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,329 at 95,131 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
157. Id.
158. Id.; see Lipton & Mazur, supra note 114, at 478-79.
159. See Slade, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,329, at 95,131;
id. at 95,132 (stating that "[h]aving assumed fiduciary responsibilities, Shearson is required to
incur whatever commercial disadvantage fulfillment of those obligations entails").
1994] 1807
SMU LAW REVIEW
view by the Second Circuit. 160 Although the court declined to answer the
question due to unresolved issues of fact, 16 1 the SEC filed an amicus curiae
brief that indicated its approval of Chinese Wall procedures.1 62 The Com-
mission's position was that a Chinese Wall combined with a restricted list
procedure was an acceptable solution to the conflicting duties.1 63 The SEC
asserted that at the time a firm enters into an investment banking or other
confidential relationship with a client in which it is likely to receive material,
nonpublic information, the firm should place the issuer on a restricted list
which would prohibit recommendations of that issuer's securities. 164
By adopting a policy to place issuers on the restricted list at the outset of
the relationship and before any inside information is actually obtained, the
Commission hoped to reduce the risk of signalling adverse or favorable in-
formation to customers.1 65 Nonetheless, as observed elsewhere, few broker-
dealers appear to be following the Commission's position, either because it is
not workable for larger firms or because it unnecessarily disadvantages their
160. Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,439, at 95,530 (S.D.N.Y.), remanded, 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974). The certified
issue was "whether an investment banker/securities broker who receives adverse material non-
public information about an investment banking client is precluded from soliciting customers
for that client's securities on the basis of public information which [because of its possession of
inside information] it knows to be false or misleading." Slade, 517 F.2d at 399. In certifying
the issue, the district court observed the "far-reaching ramifications" that the decision would
have for the securities industry:
To require organizations like defendant's to refrain from effecting transactions
in securities of companies about which they have learned adverse inside infor-
mation may be to render it exceedingly difficult for any such organization to
function as an investment banker for a company and at the same time function
as a broker-dealer in that company's securities. On the other hand, so long as
such organizations continue to exercise a dual function, they incur dual (some-
times conflicting) fiduciary obligations which neither they nor this court can
properly ignore.
Slade, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,439, at 95,532.
161. Slade, 517 F.2d at 403 (remanding for further findings); see Larry L. Varn, The Multi-
Service Securities Firm and the Chinese Wall. A New Look in the Light of the Federal Securities
Code, 63 NEB. L. REV. 197, 231 (1984) (stating that the case placed "both the securities indus-
try and other multiservice financial institutions in considerable uncertainty"). The case ulti-
mately was settled. See Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 96,473, at 93,731 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
162. Slade, 517 F.2d at 403 (stating that the "SEC... apparently looks favorably upon the
erection of a proper 'Chinese Wall' "); Lipton & Mazur, supra note 114, at 480-87 (discussing
the different amicus curiae briefs submitted by the Commission, Salomon Brothers, and Paine
Webber).
163. Lipton & Mazur, supra note 114, at 486-87.
164. Id. at 487. The restricted list would not apply to the firm's block trading or market
making transactions that did not involve any representation as to the merits of the transac-
tions. Accordingly, "while the SEC-approved no-recommendation policy would more broadly
affect a retail trader's activities than a restricted list triggered only by the receipt of inside
information, the sweep of the SEC's position, in terms of the range of trading activities af-
fected, was closely circumscribed." Id.
165. Id. (According to the SEC, "[tihere would be no signal ... if the firm restricted the
security and withdrew its outstanding recommendation at the time it entered into an invest-
ment banking or other confidential relationship, i.e., before any inside information was in fact
received."); see also Leonard Chazen, Reinforcing the Chinese Wall: A Response, 51 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 552 (1976); Lipton & Mazur, supra note 114, at 579.
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brokerage customers. 166 The Commission's position in Slade, however, re-
mains significant for its approval of the use of Chinese Wall and reinforce-
ment procedures to resolve the conflicting duties of a broker-dealer,
although the exact requirements of those procedures remain unclear.167 The
Commission has continued to endorse the use of Chinese Wall and reinforce-
ment procedures in a number of enforcement actions focusing on alleged
insider trading violations. Generally, in settlements entered in these cases,
the subject broker-dealers agreed to review and adopt procedures and poli-
cies designed to prevent future violations.168
The Commission's position on the efficacy of Chinese Walls also was man-
ifested in response to concerns that arose from an investment firm's mul-
tifaceted role in the tender offer context.' 69 The question arose when
Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. provided investment banking services to a
tender offeror and served as a co-bidder while the firm simultaneously held
an equity position in the target company.' 70 The target company obtained a
preliminary injunction against the tender offer by showing a reasonable
probability of success that the Williams Act's filing requirements had been
violated. 17 1 The district court also requested the SEC's position on whether
Shearson's investment banking role in the takeover attempt and its simulta-
neous equity position in the target company had violated the federal securi-
166. Levine et al., supra note 2, at 64 (stating that "[alt any given time, a large firm that has
ongoing relationships with its investment banking clients would be precluded from providing
investment guidance to its brokerage and advisory clients on a substantial number of issuers,
even in cases where the firm did not possess material, nonpublic information").
167. See id. at 64-66; see also infra notes 258-62 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,474, at 93,026 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (settlement in which Drexel agreed, inter
alia, to review through appointment of Independent Consultant its procedures and policies
directed at compliance, including breaches of the Chinese Wall and other improprieties); SEC
v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,271 at 96,349
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), In re Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 24-
543 (June 4, 1987) (settlement in which Kidder agreed to retain an outside consultant to re-
view its policies and procedures designed to prevent and detect violations of the federal securi-
ties laws (such review to include addressing the firm's Chinese Wall and restricted list
procedures), to adopt and maintain policies recommended by the consultant prior to resuming
such activities, and not to resume risk arbitrage trading until such procedures had been imple-
mented); SEC v. First Boston Corp., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
92,712, at 93,465 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (settlement in which First Boston agreed to review and
appropriately modify its existing Chinese Wall and restricted list procedures).
The Commission also has evidenced its approval of Chinese Wall and reinforcement mecha-
nisms in the rulemaking context, such as in its promulgation of rules 14e-3 and 17j- 1. See infra
notes 184-204 and accompanying text.
169. Koppers Co., Inc. v. American Express Co., 689 F. Supp. 1371, 1413 (W.D. Pa. 1988)
(Appendix A, letter from Daniel L. Goelzer, General Counsel of the SEC, to Honorable Mau-
rice B. Cohill, in response to a request from the court).
170. Id. at 1376-78; see also Bryan Burrough, Shearson Risks Alienation of Its Clients by
Joining Hostile Bid as Equity Partner, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1988, at 4 (acting as a bidder
Shearson was the first major investment bank to expand its traditional advisory and lending
functions).
171. Koppers, 689 F. Supp. at 1407-08. The Williams Act, adopted in 1968 as amendments
to the Securities Exchange Act, focuses principally on tender offer regulation. The legislation
added Sections 13(d), (e), and 14(d), (e), and (0 to the Exchange Act. See generally Schreiber





The Commission responded, through its General Counsel, that "violations
of the federal securities laws stemming from these conflicts can be avoided
through the use of well-established preventive policies and procedures, such
as Chinese Walls, restricted lists and watch lists."173 The Commission con-
cluded that Shearson's substantial involvement in the tender offer, including
its equity position in the target company, did not affect the availability of the
Chinese Wall and reinforcement procedures as methods to avoid certain vio-
lations of the federal securities laws. 174 The Commission stated that "[e]ven
without an equity position, the firm is subject to substantial conflicts of inter-
est that are not different in principle from the conflicts that exist where it has
an equity position."' 75 In the Commission's view, either situation could be
adequately addressed with effective policies and procedures. 76
Despite the Commission's endorsement of Chinese Walls and reinforce-
ment policies, few courts have addressed whether such policies can be used
by multiservice financial firms to avert federal securities law liability. In
Nelson v. Craig-Hallum, Inc. 177 for example, a district court denied a bro-
ker-dealer's motion for summary judgment despite the firm's reliance on its
Chinese Wall procedures. Nelson involved a broker-dealer that allegedly vi-
olated rule lOb-5 by issuing statements and recommendations in research
reports that were materially misleading in light of information possessed by
its investment banking department. The broker-dealer moved for summary
judgment, arguing that its Chinese Wall prevented the investment depart-
ment from communicating the inside information to the research
department.178
The court responded that the broker-dealer had not provided any legal
172. Koppers, 689 F. Supp. at 1414-15. The issue presented was:
Whether Shearson Holdings' multifaceted role in the takeover attempt and its
simultaneous equity position in BNS, Inc .... violate any federal securities laws
because of the apparent, inherent conflicts of interest which these roles present.
In other words, can the Chinese Wall concept, approved by the SEC in other
contexts, be extended to the situation presented here?
Id.
173. Id. at 1415.
174. Id. at 1417.
175. Id. at 1415.
176. Id. Subsequently, the SEC General Counsel qualified these comments. In a letter to
the Pennsylvania Securities Commission in connection with a probe conducted by the Penn-
sylvania legislature into the propriety of equity participation in hostile takeovers by financial
intermediaries, then SEC General Counsel Daniel L. Goelzer stated "that the Commission has
not expressed a view that a firm's equity position in the tender offeror is an irrelevant concern
in this context." Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 62, at 1620-21 n.367. Mr. Goelzer also
stated that his earlier letter to Judge Cohill in the Koppers/Shearson litigation "did not ad-
dress the question whether the presence of an equity position may affect the timing for the
implementation of preventive procedures or may affect the types of procedures that must be
implemented." Id.
177. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,500, at 93,191 (D. Minn. 1989)(asserted defense of unwritten Chinese Wall policy prohibiting interdepartmental communica-
tions, when factual issue existed as to whether the policy was even followed, not sufficient to
support a motion for summary judgment).
178. Id. at 93,191.
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authority for the position that "brokerage firms who perform both invest-
ment banking and securities sales functions can rely on an unwritten 'Chi-
nese Wall' policy as demonstrating lack of knowledge and scienter in an
action under Rule lOb-5."' 79 The court further pointed to authority that
Chinese Walls must be enhanced with reinforcement procedures, such as
restricted lists, to preclude improper recommendations and trading.18 0
Nonetheless, the court declined to set forth the parameters of an acceptable
Chinese Wall policy. Due to the existence of disputed issues of fact as to
whether the unwritten Chinese Wall policy was even followed, the court de-
nied the brokerage firm's motion for summary judgment.18 1
The Nelson case, although not very instructive due to the serious doubts
that arose as to whether the firm really employed Chinese Wall procedures,
is helpful in a few respects. First, the case demonstrates the importance of
formal, written procedures; the broker-dealer's reliance on unwritten proce-
dures appeared to have created an insurmountable obstacle. In this respect,
the existence of a written policy should be beneficial to show that in fact
certain procedures existed. Second, documentation of compliance and en-
forcement efforts is essential to overcome the perception that the purported
procedures merely serve as an escape hatch for personal liability without
providing practical benefits. In sum, the failure to undertake basic measures
may illustrate the significant burden that a firm will face at the time when
effective procedures can provide great value: in support of a motion for sum-
mary judgment.18 2
Finally, the Nelson court's reference to the need for reinforcement meas-
ures like restricted lists and no-recommendation policies provides some in-
sight into the legal sufficiency of Chinese Walls. The court's language as
well as other developments provide support to the Commission's position
that reinforced Chinese Walls are necessary to establish adequate procedures
in the broker-dealer context.183
b. Regulatory Treatment of Chinese Walls
(1) RULE 14e-3
In the context of tender offers, the Commission expressed its approval for
Chinese Walls and reinforcement procedures when it adopted rule 14e-3.1 84
The Commission provided a safe harbor to the rule's "disclose or abstain"
179. Id. at 93,192.
180. Id. (citing Lipton & Mazur, supra note 114).
181. Id. at 93,192.
182. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 62, at 1622-23; supra notes 40-67 and accompa-
nying text.
183. See Cotton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 251, 256
(N.D. Okla. 1988) (impliedly recognizing validity of Chinese Wall procedures as means to
avoid liability); Nelson, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,500, at 92,192;
Connell v. Chase Manhattan Bank Nat'l Ass'n, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 15, 1981, at 7; see also Pitt &
Groskaufmanis, supra note 62, at 1623 (observing that "the courts have been hesitant to recog-
nize a Chinese Wall defense").
184. Rule 14e-3(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1994); see Rule 14e-3 Release, supra note
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provision for entities that implement certain policies and procedures. With
certain exceptions, rule 14e-3 generally imposes liability on persons who are
in possession of material, nonpublic information relating to a tender offer
and who purchase or sell (or tip such information relating to) the subject
securities, unless the information and its source are publicly disclosed in a
timely manner. ' 85
The rule provides a safe harbor for entities that would otherwise violate its
provisions. This safe harbor covers purchases and sales by nonnatural per-
sons, typically multiservice financial institutions, if the entity can show that
the individuals making the investment decision did not know the nonpublic
information and that the entity had established policies and procedures, rea-
sonable under the circumstances, to ensure that its individuals would not
violate rule 14e-3(a). 18 6 In determining the reasonableness of the policies
and procedures, the rule takes into account the nature of the entity's busi-
ness.' 8 7 Chinese Walls and restricted lists are specifically identified as exam-
ples of policies and procedures that may prevent individual decisionmakers
from learning or using such inside information. 88
In the SEC's adopting release- for rule 14e-3, the Commission made some
observations on the use of Chinese Walls. First, the Commission stated that
it may be appropriate in some circumstances for an institution to advise its
customers of the use of Chinese Walls since the institution would not be
using all information that it receives for the benefit of such customers. 18 9
Second, since Chinese Walls are not always effective to prevent the flow of
information, the Commission noted that institutions often use other proce-
dures to supplement the walls. 190 The Commission referred to watch lists as
such a procedure, enabling the affected institution to monitor trading activ-
ity to detect the occurrence of leaks.' 9 '
The Commission stated that a particular situation may merit the use of
both restricted lists and Chinese Walls and that business judgment may
185. Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1994). The person must know or have reason to
know that the information has been acquired directly or indirectly from certain parties in-
volved in the tender offer, including the offering person, the issuer of the target securities, and
any persons acting on their behalf. Id.
186. See id. § 240.14e-3(b); Rule 14e-3 Release, supra note 132, at 83,460.
187. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(b) (1994); Rule 14e-3 Release, supra note 132, at 83,461
("Depending upon the nature of the activities of a particular institution, it may use a Chinese
Wall or a restricted list or a combination of these and other procedures. The specific policies
and procedures selected by an institution will be those which will be most effective in prevent-
ing the misuse of material, nonpublic information.").
188. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(b)(2)(i), (ii) (1994). See Rule 14e-3 Release, supra note 132, at
83,461. Specifically, the rule refers to policies and procedures "which restrict any purchase,
sale and causing any purchase and sale of any such security or ... which prevent such individ-
ual(s) from knowing such information." Id. In its release of the rule, the Commission referred
to such procedures respectively as restricted lists and Chinese Walls. Note that the institution
has the burden of proof to show that the elements for invoking the safe harbor have been met.
Id.
189. Rule 14e-3 Release, supra note 132, at 83,461.
190. Id.; see supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
191. Rule 14e-3 Release, supra note 132, at 83,461; Commission Division Report, supra
note 137, at 84,680 n.15; see also supra note 143.
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counsel procedures in addition to those specified in rule 14e-3(b). 192 Thus,
although rule 14e-3 evidences the Commission's approval of Chinese Walls,
it also reinforces the SEC's belief that Chinese Walls, by themselves, may not
always prove to be sufficient under the circumstances. Rule 14e-3 therefore
provides additional authority for the proposition that Chinese Walls must be
reinforced with restricted lists, watch lists, and other measures that can de-
tect leaks and prevent abuses in order for an institution to have adequate
policies and procedures. 193
(2) RULE 17j-1
Rule 17j-1 is another example of the Commission's approval of written
policies and procedures that are designed to prevent and detect fraudulent
practices that can arise from potential conflicts of interest in the financial
intermediary context. 194 The rule requires the adoption and enforcement of
written codes of ethics in the registered investment company context. The
Commission stated in its adopting release that the code of ethics should ad-
dress "conflict of interest situations where access persons improperly are
able to gain personal benefit through their relationship with the investment
company." 195
Section (b)(1) of rule 17j-1 requires investment companies to adopt "a
written code of ethics containing provisions reasonably necessary to pre-
vent" violations of the rule's anti-fraud provision and requires them to "use
reasonable diligence, and institute procedures reasonably necessary, to pre-
vent violations of such code."1 9 6 Section (a) of the rule is a general anti-
fraud provision that makes it unlawful for any person affiliated with a regis-
tered investment company, or any person affiliated with an investment advi-
sor or principal underwriter of a registered investment company, from
committing any fraudulent and deceptive practice in connection with the
purchase or sale by such person of any security held or to be acquired by
such registered investment company.19 7
The Commission emphasized in its release that an investment company's
adoption of a code must go beyond the mere detection of improper acts. The
release stated that an entity adopting a code of ethics also has an affirmative
duty to enforce its provisions, and the code itself should include measures
192. See Rule 14e-3 Release, supra note 132, at 83,461.
193. See id. at 83,460-83,461; see also Commission Division Report, supra note 137, at
84,680. For further discussion on rule 14e-3, see Steinberg, supra note 131, § 3.06, and Com-
ment, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information Under Rule 14e-3, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
539 (1981).
194. Investment Company Act Release No. 11421, 21 SEC Docket 488, [1980 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,679 (Oct. 31, 1980) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1
(1994)) [hereinafter ICA Release].
195. Id. at 83,735.
196. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-l(b) (1994). In the adopting release, the SEC stated that it was
"not attempting to list all activities and circumstances which could or should be the subject of
concern by those entities, for it is the entities themselves, required by the Rule to adopt codes
of ethics, that bear the primary responsibility for identifying those areas which present a poten-
tial for abuse by access persons." ICA Release, supra note 194, at 83,736.




Rule 17j-1(c) requires persons covered by the anti-fraud provision that
qualify as "access persons" to report transactions in any security in which
the person acquires any direct or indirect beneficial ownership interest. 99
"Access persons" generally include directors, officers, or general partners of
registered investment companies and their investment advisors or principal
underwriters. 200 The term also includes "advisory persons" who are em-
ployees of registered investment companies, or an investment advisor
thereof, whose regular job functions involve obtaining information on, or
making recommendations relating to, the purchase or sale of securities by a
registered investment company. 20
Investment companies also must maintain records that document the code
of ethics adopted and their compliance as well as enforcement efforts there-
under.20 2 In regard thereto, a subject company must maintain a copy of its
code of ethics, a list of all persons who qualify as access persons, reports
submitted by such access persons, and records of any violations and subse-
quent actions taken in response to any such violation of its code of ethics.20 3
Such documentation must be maintained in an easily accessible place to ac-
commodate examinations by the SEC.2 °4
(3) BANKING REGULATIONS
Federal banking regulators have adopted positions that require banks to
implement written procedures designed to prevent insider trading.20 5 In a
policy statement, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
("Board") defined the use of material nonpublic information by banks in
connection with decisions to effect or recommend securities transactions as
an unsafe and unsound banking practice. 206 Furthermore, the Board ex-
pects its member banks that exercise investment discretion for the accounts
of others to implement written policies and procedures reasonably designed
198. ICA Release, supra note 194, at 83,737.
199. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1(c)(1) (1994). Such report is made to the investment company,
investment adviser, or principal underwriter of which such person is an access person. The
report must state the date of the transaction, the title and number of shares, the principal
amount of each security involved, the price at which the transaction was effected, and the
name of the broker, dealer, or bank with or through whom the transaction was effected. Id.
§ 270.17j-I(c)(2).
200. Id. § 270.17j-l(e)(l).
201. Id. § 270.17j-l(e)(l),(2); see United States v. Ostrander, 792 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (denying motion to dismiss indictment based on portfolio manager's failure as an access
person to disclose transactions in securities); In re Farrer, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,332 (Mar. 31, 1983) (finding that a securities analyst for an invest-
ment advisor, whose duties included making recommendations of securities, was an access
person who violated rule 17j-1 by failing to report numerous securities transactions).
202. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-l(d) (1994).
203. Id.
204. Id. Generally, such documents must be maintained for a period of at least five years.
Id.; see In re First Investor's Management Co., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1316
(June 12, 1992) (enforcement action settled alleging, inter alia, failure to maintain records and
to oversee timely filing of reports by access persons); Pitt & Johnson, supra note 118, at 19-20.
205. Federal Reserve Policy, supra note 119; 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d) (1994).
206. Federal Reserve Policy, supra note 119, at 12,756.
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to ensure that such abuse of inside information does not occur. 20 7
Rather than adopting specific policies, the Board elected not only to pro-
vide examples of possible procedures that focus on preventing the improper
flow of information between bank departments but also to outline courses of
action to be taken in response to leaks that are discovered. 20 8 Examples of
approaches included:
(i) denying trust department personnel (namely, bank personnel whose
duties encompass the making of investment decisions or recommendations
on behalf of agency or fiduciary accounts) access to files that may contain
material inside information, such as commercial credit files;
(ii) with certain exceptions, such as where a new customer relationship is
sought, precluding trust department personnel from attending meetings be-
tween or among commercial lending or underwriting personnel and bank
customers;
(iii) to the extent appropriate, considering the circumstances of the partic-
ular bank, physically separating trust department personnel from the com-
mercial lending and underwriting departments;
(iv) mandating that trust department personnel inform their superiors
when they suspect having material inside information;
(v) instructing management as to the proper course of action to be pur-
sued when leaks of material nonpublic are detected, such as ascertaining the
validity and nonpublic aspect of the information, contacting the bank's legal
counsel for guidance, notifying the issuer of the affected securities and re-
questing such issuer to promptly and publicly disseminate the information,
and halting the bank's trading and recommendations in the affected securi-
ties. 20 9 The Board stated that the above policies were generally more appli-
cable to larger banks. 210
Likewise, the Comptroller of the Currency has promulgated a rule requir-
ing the trust departments of national banks to adopt "written policies and
procedures to ensure that the Federal securities laws are complied with in
connection with any decision or recommendation to purchase or sell any
security. ' 21' The rule states that such policies should specifically protect
against the abuse of material inside information by the trust departments of
banks. 212 The Comptroller adopted a general and flexible rule that allows
individual banks to determine which policies and procedures are best suited
for their situations. As such, the Comptroller provided no guidance on any




210. Id. (describing large banks, in 1978, as those which manage assets for the accounts of
others having a market value greater than $100 million).
211. 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d) (1994).
212. 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d) (1994).
213. See id. As stated by the Comptroller in the proposed rulemaking release:
The Comptroller of the Currency believes that the objective sought by the pro-
posed amendment will be achieved best by a general and flexible approach, and




Broker-dealers must comply with the rules of the self-regulatory organiza-
tions ("SROs") of which they are members. 2 14 In this context, SROs have
promulgated rules requiring the adoption of procedures designed to prevent
and detect insider trading. 215 For instance, the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") requires its members to subject employee and proprietary trading
"to review procedures that the member . . .determines to be reasonably
designed to identify trades" that may violate the securities laws prohibiting
insider trading.2 16 If a NYSE member determines that a trade appears to
have violated the securities laws, it must "[c]onduct promptly an internal
investigation. ' 2 17 The NYSE rules also require its members to designate a
high-level official to assume overall authority and responsibility for compli-
ance with the securities laws. 21 8
In addition, the NYSE standards set forth reporting and supervisory man-
dates relating to each member's compliance program and procedures.2 19
The rule requires each member organization to submit an annual report on
its supervisory and compliance efforts to the organization's chief executive
officer or managing partner. The report must include a tabulation of such
matters as customer complaints and internal investigations, a discussion of
significant compliance issues, and plans for instituting procedures to address
future compliance concerns. The report also must provide a discussion that
breaks down the firm's compliance efforts in the areas of anti-fraud, invest-
amendment allows each bank, regardless of size, to choose appropriate written
policies and procedures which would prohibit the use of material inside informa-
tion in connection with decisions or recommendations to purchase or sell securi-
ties. Banks may decide after consultation with counsel to adopt a "Chinese
Wall," or they may decide to adopt other appropriate measures.
42 Fed. Reg. 56338 (Oct. 25, 1977).
214. See Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78oA-3(b)(7) (1988); RALPH S. JANVEY,
REGULATION OF THE SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES MARKETS 4.01-.02 (1992) (setting
forth that broker-dealers must adhere to SRO rules).
215. See infra notes 216-22 and accompanying text. In addition, the exchanges have ap-
proved the use of Chinese Walls to "create specific exemptions from Exchange rules which
prohibit specialists from affiliating and engaging in certain transactions with nonspecialist re-
tail firms." Doty & Powers, supra note 113, at 166-70, discussing NYSE Rule 98 and Ameri-
can Stock Exchange (AMEX) Rule 193, and observing, id. at 169, that
[t]he SEC approved both the NYSE and AMEX rule proposals, largely relying
on the Chinese Wall procedures to prevent abuse of the relationships of a spe-
cialist in affiliation with an upstairs firm .. .[and] assum[ing] that, if effective,
the Chinese Wall would prevent undesirable and possibly unlawful conduct
without exposing either affiliate to liability for breach of fiduciary duty or viola-
tions of the federal securities laws.
See also Alleged Holes in Chinese Wall Net Shearson $500,000 NYSE Fine, 24 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1029 (1992) (NYSE fined Shearson Lehman Brothers Inc. for its failure to super-
vise adequately its proprietary trading and to catch short sales by an employee in securities on
the firm's watch list).
216. N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2342, Rule 342.21(a) (as amended May 27, 1988). The
trades that must be reviewed include trades for the account of the member organization, allied
members, employees of the member and family members of employees. Id.
217. Id. Rule 342.21(b).
218. Id. Rule 342(b) (as amended Aug. 27, 1976).
219. Id. Rule 342.30 (as amended May 27, 1988); Securities Exchange Act Release No.
25,763, 53 Fed. Reg. 20,925 (June 7, 1988) (approving the rule).
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ment banking, trading and sales practices, finance and operations, books and
records, and supervision. 220
The rule also requires members to file a quarterly certificate with the
NYSE stating that the firm has established and carried out adequate review
procedures for proprietary trades and for trades by employees subject to
scrutiny and attesting that the personnel responsible for the procedures have
"no reasonable cause to believe" that insider trading violations have oc-
curred.22 1 If an investigation is being conducted by a member with respect
to suspect trading, such member must report to the NYSE the quarterly
progress of such investigation. 222
C. BROKER-DEALER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES: CHINESE WALLS
AND THEIR MINIMUM ELEMENTS
In 1990, the SEC's Division of Market Regulation ("Division") released
its Report, detailing the results of its study regarding the efficacy of broker-
dealer policies and procedures designed to prevent the misuse of material,
nonpublic information.2 23 The Report was a comprehensive review of bro-
ker-dealer policies used by major New York firms and representative re-
gional firms. All firms performed some level of investment banking and
research services, and all but two New York firms had active retail sales and
market making activities.2 24 The Division concluded that, although the
firms reviewed generally had improved their procedures, certain areas were
in need of improvement.2 25 The Report concluded that while no rule-mak-
ing effort was necessary at that time, if the self-regulatory process declined to
make certain necessary improvements or if the process failed to remedy the
deficiencies that existed, then rule-making authority may be used.2 26
In the Report, the Division referred to the policies and procedures re-
quired by Section 15(f) as Chinese Wall procedures, which it defined gener-
ally as "policies and procedures . . . to segment the flow of sensitive
220. N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2342, Rule 342.30; see Herlihy et al., supra note 131, at 4
(discussing the NYSE rules).
221. N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2351, Rule 351(e) (as amended Mar. 22, 1990). Insider
trading violations include violations of the provisions of the Exchange Act, the SEC rules
thereunder, and the NYSE rules.
222. Id.; see Securities Exchange Act Release No. 25,763, 53 Fed. Reg. 20,925, 20,926
(June 7, 1988); Herlihy et al., supra note 131, at 4; see also SEC Approves PSE Rule on Insider
Trading Prevention, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1621 (1993) (adoption of rules mandating
Pacific Stock Exchange (PSE) members to adopt and implement policies and procedures to
avoid insider trading violations by PSE members and associated persons).
223. SEC Division Report, supra note 64. In 1993, the Division issued a report focusing on
internal control procedures that broker-dealers have implemented to prevent and detect the
abuse of material, nonpublic information by the respective firms and their affiliated persons in
non-investment grade ("High Yield") securities. See Commission Division Report, supra note
137, at 84,676-83.
224. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,619-20.
225. See id. at 80,617, 80,628-29.
226. See id. at 80,629. In its 1993 report in the area of High Yield securities, the SEC staff
likewise declined to recommend the undertaking of SEC rule-making at that time. See Com-
mission Division Report, supra note 137, at 84,677.
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information. '2 27 Operating on the premise that broker-dealers must estab-
lish "Chinese Walls," one of the Division's principal findings was the identi-
fication of minimum standards for adequate Chinese Walls. 228
The Division identified four elements that it deemed necessary for a bro-
ker-dealer to establish an adequate Chinese Wall:
(1) substantial control (preferably by the compliance department) of
relevant interdepartmental communications;
(2) the review of employee trading through the effective maintenance of
some combination of watch, restricted, and rumor lists;
(3) dramatic improvement in the memorialization of Chinese Wall pro-
cedures and documentation of actions taken pursuant to those pro-
cedures; and
(4) the heightened review or restriction of proprietary trading while the
firm is in possession of material, nonpublic information. 229
These four minimum elements are elaborated upon in the ensuing
discussion.
1. Control of Interdepartmental Communications
All firms in the survey had procedures designed to limit the flow of infor-
mation between departments. The focus of these procedures is to segregate
the investment banking departments from other departments in the firm.230
a. Central Role of Compliance Department in Supervising
Interdepartmental Communications and Chinese Wall
Compliance
In its 1990 Report, the Division repeatedly emphasized that each firm
should have a compliance or legal department that plays a central role in the
establishment and enforcement of Chinese Wall procedures. 231 The Report
identified at least three areas in which the compliance department should
take a central role: (i) interdepartmental communications; (ii) maintenance
of watch lists and restricted lists; and (iii) employee trading reviews. 232
i. Significant Interdepartmental Communications
An important function of a broker-dealer's compliance department is to
control the flow of information when different departments need to commu-
nicate with one another. For instance, how can investment banking person-
nel request information from other departments, such as research or sales,
227. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,618 n.5; see discussion supra notes 132-37
and accompanying text.
228. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,625-27.
229. Id. at 80,625.
230. Id. at 80,621; see Herlihy et al., supra note 131, at 5 (observing that "in multiservice
securities firms, personnel in retail sales, research, trading and investment advisory operations
are prohibited from having access to information held by the firm's investment bankers").
231. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,627 (stating that "the compliance depart-
ment at multiservice firms must take the central role in the administration of the firms' Chi-
nese Wall procedures").
232. Id. at 80,621-25.
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without tipping confidential information? The solution is usually to bring
the personnel in other departments "over the wall"; i.e., they become tempo-
rary insiders of the investment banking department for surveillance pur-
poses.233 The Report recommends that a firm's compliance department
have a central role in the administration of the firm's Chinese Wall proce-
dures, including decisions to bring personnel over the wall.234 In any event,
the compliance department should be informed of decisions to bring people
over the wall and should maintain adequate records on personnel while they
are temporary insiders.235
A topic related to interdepartmental communications is a firm's review of
research reports. In some instances, a research department will issue re-
ports while the investment banking department is in possession of material,
nonpublic information.236 The Division found that all firms in the survey
had their compliance departments review research reports for numerous rea-
sons, not all of which were related to Chinese Wall concerns. 237 If the com-
pliance department determines that the report is damaging or incorrect in
light of inside information held by the investment banking department, the
majority of firms pull or delay the report. 238 To limit the risks of tipping the
research analyst or the investing audience that the firm possesses inside in-
formation about a company, firms usually bring the analyst over the wall
and take measures to limit his or her public comments about the
company. 239
ii. Maintenance of Watch and Restricted Lists
One of the compliance department's most important roles is its involve-
ment in the placement of trading restrictions on the securities of issuers
about whom the firm has inside information.24° In many firms, the head of
the investment banking department makes the initial decision whether such
restrictions are necessary, but the compliance department should be involved
to evaluate such decisions. 24' Involving the compliance department can
help ensure that decisions to place restrictions on issuers occur on a timely
233. Id. at 80,621-22.
234. Id. at 80,622; see supra note 137 and accompanying text.
235. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,627. The Report observed that in a
number of firms the compliance department was either not adequately informed that personnel
were brought over the wall or the compliance department failed to keep adequate records on
"temporary insiders." Id. at 80,622.
236. See Herlihy et al., supra note 131, at 7; Levine et al., supra note 2, at 44; supra note
137 and accompanying text.
237. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,623.
238. Id. A few firms, however, maintain the division between departments and do not
normally pull or delay the reports. Id.
239. Id. These measures include removing the analyst from public accessibility or in-
structing the analyst to give neutral responses to public inquiries. Id.; see Commission Divi-
sion Report, supra note 137, at 84,680 (observing that several firms apply Chinese Wall
procedures to research reports concerning High Yield securities).
240. Restricted lists and watch lists are used to identify such stocks and to ensure compli-
ance. For a discussion of these mechanisms, see supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text;
infra notes 256-80 and accompanying text.
241. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,623-24.
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basis. Once issuers are placed on a list, the compliance department should
be responsible for reviewing trades to detect breaches. 242
iii. Responsibility for Review of Employee Trading
The Division's Report states that the compliance department must func-
tion in "the area ultimately responsible for employee trade surveillance. '243
The different trading restrictions that broker-dealers place on employees are
discussed below. The important point here is that firms must have a compli-
ance department that is ultimately responsible for the establishment, en-
forcement, and documentation of those procedures. 2"
b. Physical Barriers
All firms surveyed in the Report employed some physical techniques to
restrict the flow of information between departments.245 The devices include
the physical separation of departments; procedures that restrict access to
files, offices, and computers; and the use of code names or words when dis-
cussing sensitive topics. 246 The widespread use among broker-dealers of
these techniques leads to the conclusion that they are an essential element of
an adequate Chinese Wall. 247
2. Trading Restrictions
All firms in the survey placed some restrictions on trading by customers,
employees, and principals. 248 Most firms require employees to maintain all
of their trading accounts with the respective firm; others require employees
to submit trade confirmations and monthly account statements for their
outside trading accounts. 249 Firms require pre-clearance of trades to vary-
242. Id.; see Commission Division Report, supra note 137, at 84,681-83.
243. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,627.
244. Id.
The Division believes that the compliance departments at multiservice firms
must take the central role in the administration of the firms' Chinese Wall pro-
cedures. In particular, compliance must be informed and must maintain records
of significant interdepartmental communications, such as bringing an employee
over the wall. Further, compliance must take an interactive role with invest-
ment banking or other departments in the placement and removal of issues from
watch or restricted lists. Finally, compliance must be the area ultimately re-
sponsible for employee trade surveillance. Although useful as a supplement,
employee trade review by supervisors who do not know the content of a watch
list or do not have a sense of the firm's overall business position without concur-
rent surveillance by the compliance department is inadequate.
Id. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text; infra notes 256-80 and accompanying text.
245. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,621.
246. Id.
247. Indeed, because implementation of these techniques is the industry norm, failure to
adhere thereto will incur liability risk. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 6055; supra
notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
248. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,621.
249. Id. at 80,621 n.21. With certain exceptions, this requirement extends to the accounts
of family members of the employee. Id.; see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 6059:
[T]he Committee does not consider the responsibility of a firm to be entirely
released because an employee's illicit trading occurred in an account held at
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ing degrees. Some smaller firms require pre-clearance of all employee trades,
while larger firms may limit pre-clearance to sensitive departments like in-
vestment banking.250 Firms sometimes prohibit any trades in client securi-
ties, especially for those individuals connected with the respective firm's
investment banking department. 2 51 Another common procedure is to pre-
vent trading in an issuer's security during a certain time period, usually two
to five days, after the issuance of a research report on that issuer. 252
For employee trading that is allowed, firms place general restrictions on
the types of trades and holding periods. These restrictions include minimum
holding periods for investments and prohibitions on short sales, options and
warrants. 2 53 As discussed earlier, compliance departments should play a
central role in the development and enforcement of these restrictions. 254
In addition to these general restrictions, broker-dealers have developed
lists that identify issuers about which the firm has, or is likely to have, mate-
rial, nonpublic information. These lists are usually broken down into three
types: restricted lists, watch lists, and rumor lists. The Division viewed us-
ing some combination of these three lists to review employee trading as a
minimum element of an adequate Chinese Wall. 2 55
a. Restricted Lists
A restricted list identifies securities in which employee and proprietary
trading is restricted or prohibited.25 6 The list generally also prohibits a
firm's personnel from soliciting and recommending trades in the subject is-
suer's securities. 257 The Division suggested that restricted lists were less
suited for Chinese Wall purposes than watch lists.258 This is because re-
stricted lists are generally distributed on a wide basis throughout the firm
and therefore compromise secrecy. 259 When used for Chinese Wall pur-
poses, restricted lists are usually employed when a deal is about to go pub-
lic.26° The Division found that the firms that continued to use restricted lists
another firm. For example, the Committee would expect that a firm's supervi-
sory system would include, at a minimum, employment policies such as those
requiring personnel to conduct their securities trading through in-house ac-
counts or requiring that any trading in outside accounts be reported expedi-
tiously to the employing firm.




254. See supra notes 231-44 and accompanying text.
255. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,625-26; see supra notes 142-46 and accom-
panying text; infra notes 256-80 and accompanying text.
256. -SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,619 n. 11; see supra note 143 and accompa-
nying text.
257. See sources cited supra note 256; see also Levine et al., supra note 2, at 63 (pointing
out that "[m]ultiservice firms developed Restricted List procedures as a means of avoiding
violations of Section 5 of the 1933 Act or Rule 10b-6 of the Exchange Act").
258. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,624.
259. Id. at 80,624; see Ferrara & Thomas, supra note 126, at 187 (observing that restricted
lists "are broadly disseminated, generally without pretense of secrecy, whenever a deal is about
to be made public."); supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
260. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,624; see supra notes 164-68, 259 and ac-
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instead of watch lists in this context lacked significant merger and acquisi-
tion activity; thus, these firms had less need "to maintain state of the art
procedures. '261 Most firms continue to use restricted list procedures, but
they are usually employed to address regulatory concerns other than Chi-
nese Wall issues. 262
b. Watch Lists
Restricted list procedures should be contrasted with watch list or grey list
procedures that are often employed to monitor and reinforce a Chinese Wall.
Under a watch list, the firm's legal or compliance staff prepares a confiden-
tial list of securities of issuers with respect to which the firm is about to
obtain or currently possesses material, nonpublic information or whose se-
curities the firm is considering to distribute in a public offering. 263 The com-
pliance staff uses the watch list to monitor trades by the firm, its employees,
and clients in order to detect whether there are breaches in the Chinese
Wall. 2 6 4
In its Report, the Division noted that firms differed in their methods of
placing companies on watch lists. 265 Some firms adopted a flexible approach
companying text; see also Levine et al., supra note 2, at 64 (asserting that many firms place a
security on their restricted list only after the transaction has been publicly announced).
261. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,624.
262. Id. at 80,624 n.35 (noting that firms use restricted lists to prevent violations of rule
lOb-6 and to ensure trading in securities does not occur until after the issuance of a research
report); see Levine et al., supra note 2, at 63.
263. See Levine et al., supra note 2, at 65; supra note 144 and accompanying text. As
stated in the SEC Division Report:
Watch lists have limited distributions, and are designed to permit review with-
out tipping firm or industry personnel as to the existence of a relationship be-
tween a broker-dealer and issuer. Generally, the contents of the watch list are
known to the compliance or legal department (whichever is performing the sur-
veillance function), the head of investment banking, select senior management,
and sometimes the head of proprietary trading or research. Placement of stocks
on the watch list differs from firm to firm, but generally placement occurs when
discussions between the broker-dealer and client reach a point where clear busi-
ness objectives have been identified.
SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,623.
264. See Levine et al., supra note 2, at 65; see Herlihy et al., supra note 131, at 8; supra
notes 144, 173 and accompanying text; see also SEC Division Report, supra note 64:
Responsibility for placement of securities on a watch list involves some type of
cooperative effort between compliance and investment banking. The head of
investment banking generally makes the initial placement determination, either
with consultation with the head of compliance or subject to compliance review
and approval. A few firms noted that the decision-making responsibilities rested
only with investment banking, with no consultation or review by compliance,
and therefore no opportunity by compliance to evaluate when the investment
banking head is making a practice of waiting too long to place a security on the
watch list. Most firms maintain a watch list log, recording when each security is
added to or deleted from the list. Firms with small watch lists (the result of less
active Investment Banking Departments) may disseminate the list each time it is
amended. Major merger and acquisition firms disseminate the new list biweekly
or monthly, because of the impracticality of reissuing a constantly changing
document.
Id.
265. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,623.
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that triggered watch list status when discussions with a company provided
the firm with inside information. Other firms used concrete events like the
signing of an engagement letter or the identification of a potential target or
buyer.266 Since automatic trigger events (like the signing of an engagement
letter) can occur after the firm comes into possession of material, nonpublic
information, the Division favored a case-by-case approach, with the firm's
compliance department providing meaningful review. Nonetheless, the Di-
vision observed that most firms claim adherence to a cautious approach
when deciding whether to place an issuer's securities on the watch list.267
As with most devices, firms utilize watch lists to varying degrees based on
the size and nature of their practice. Smaller firms ordinarily review all
trades executed by the firm to detect suspicious activity in securities on the
watch list.268 Major firms generally employ more sophisticated techniques
due to their large trading volumes. Their reviews will include retroactive
reviews, usually from five to thirty days, from the date that an issuer is
placed on the watch list. The compliance department will then review all
employee and proprietary trading on a next-day basis.269 If trading is de-
tected in a watch list security, firms normally do not question the trades
unless a pattern develops or if there exists an obvious connection between
the trader and the source of the inside information. 270
Restricted lists have the advantage over watch lists of providing pre-trans-
action review that helps to ensure that certain conduct never occurs. Re-
stricted lists, however, run the risk that an issuer on the list may become
known to persons outside the firm and signal to the market a pending trans-
action.2 71 The confidentiality of watch lists should avoid this risk of prema-
ture disclosure. 272 Watch lists also allow multiservice firm departments that
do not have knowledge of material, nonpublic information to "continue to
take advantage of business opportunities without restrictions on securities
transactions. '273 In its review of broker-dealer policies, the Division de-
scribed surveillance of watch lists as "the single most significant element of
266. Id. at 80,623 n.30.
267. Id at 80,623.
268. Id. at 80,623-25. Hence, every trade executed by the firm, (i.e., customer, employee,
proprietary, and principal) is reviewed. Id.
269. Id. at 80,624. The purpose of such review is to identify potentially suspicious em-
ployee trading and examine proprietary positions or activity. Id. Moreover, some major firms
review all trades that exceed a predetermined percentage of market volume. Id.
270. Id. With respect to those firms that break or cancel trades made by employees in
watch list securities as a matter of practice, "the Division believes that such action probably
represents a clear tip to the employee." Id. at 80,624 n.33.
271. See Levine et al., supra note 2, at 65; supra notes 165-68, 258-62 and accompanying
text.
272. See SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,623 (objective is to maintain confidenti-
ality of content of watch list); Ferrara & Thomas, supra note 126, at 187 (stating that "confi-
dentiality of a watch list is essential"). Hence, dissemination of the watch list normally is
limited to the compliance department (or the department charged with surveillance), certain
senior management individuals, the investment banking head, and perhaps the head of certain
other departments, such as research and proprietary trading. See SEC Division Report, supra
note 64, at 80,623.
273. See Levine et al., supra note 2, at 65.
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Chinese Wall review procedures. '274 As noted earlier, the Division sug-
gested a preference for using watch lists over restricted lists, especially when
a firm conducts significant merger and acquisition activity. 275
c. Rumor Lists
Rumor lists cover securities of issuers that are involved in a recently an-
nounced deal or that are subject to rumors relating to a pending transac-
tion.276 Their primary distinction from watch or restricted lists is that
rumor lists are not limited to issuers that are doing business with the firm. 277
The Division's report noted that only a few major New York broker-dealer
firms in the survey employed rumor lists and that such lists served to supple-
ment the respective firm's watch and restricted lists.278 In its discussion of
minimum standards for Chinese Walls and reinforcement procedures, the
Division stated that the New York Stock Exchange should consider "a re-
quirement for firms to establish procedures, including, among other things,
use of rumor lists, to review customer, employee, and proprietary trading on
third party deals."'279 Based on the Division's praise for rumor lists, broker-
dealers should consider their adoption.280
3. Memorialization of Procedures and Documentation of Efforts
a. Formalization of Firm Policies and Procedures
The Division recommended dramatic improvement in the memorializa-
tion of existing broker-dealer procedures in order for firms to establish the
minimum elements of an adequate Chinese Wall. 28 ' The Division noted that
274. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,624.
275. Id. at 80,624-25; see supra notes 258-62 and accompanying text.
276. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,625.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 80,626.
280. The use of Chinese Walls and reinforcement procedures has been subject to criticism.
Professor Poser pointed out that "perhaps the focus should be shifted away from the securities
firms that set up Chinese Walls, toward the customers and clients who are on the receiving end
of the conflicts of interest." Norman S. Poser, Conflicts of Interest Within Securities Firms, 16
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 111, 112 (1990). He observed: "It is difficult to know how effective these
procedures have been; despite the omnipresence of Chinese Walls, several insider trading cases
involving investment banking firms have been reported." Id. at 113.
Even more emphatical is former Senator William Proxmire's perception that "in case after
case after case, the Chinese Wall is a phony, it's a fake, it doesn't work, there's too much
temptation." Improper Activities in the Securities Industry: Hearings Before the Senate Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1987) (statement of
Sen. William Proxmire). The House Report likewise observed that "questions have been
raised about the efficacy of some firms['] 'Chinese Walls.'" HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at
6052. To resolve this problem, the House Committee perceived "a need for an affirmative
statutory obligation for every broker, dealer and investment advisor to design effective proce-
dures to restrict and monitor access to such information and prevent insider trading." Id. The
legislation enacted contains such an obligation. See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
In view of the 1988 legislation, broker-dealers and investment advisors should develop and
implement sufficient Chinese Wall and reinforcement procedures so as to withstand SEC and
SRO scrutiny.
281. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,625. The Report stated that "the proce-
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many firms lacked written procedures to explain their watch and restricted
lists. Firms should avoid having procedures that consist of "a loose mixture
of internal memoranda, excerpts from employee manuals, and
certifications. ,282
Based on the Division's report, broker-dealers should compile and organ-
ize their procedures in a formal fashion.283 Indeed, since ITSFEA's passage
in 1988, firms have formalized their procedures that address the minimum
elements of Chinese Walls. 284 Such procedures will help demonstrate that
the firm has made a serious effort to discharge its obligation to establish
"written policies and procedures reasonably designed.., to prevent the mis-
use ... of material, nonpublic information .... ,,285
b. Documentation of Compliance Efforts
The Division also found that the majority of firms were seriously lacking
in their documentation of their efforts taken under their respective Chinese
Wall procedures. 286 The Division recognized that the level of adequate doc-
umentation would differ between smaller firms and larger multiservice firms,
but it warned that the "failure to maintain documentation sufficient to re-
create actions taken pursuant to Chinese Wall procedures will make reviews
and determinations of the adequacy of procedures and compliance efforts
dures of the great majority of firms need to be structured and memorialized more than is
current practice." Id. at 80,626.
282. Id. at 80,625-26.
283. See id. at 80,626.
284. See Joint Memo on Chinese Wall Policies and Procedures, By the New York Stock
Exchange and National Association of Securities Dealers, NASD Notice to Members No. 91-
45 (June 21, 1991) [hereinafter Joint Memo] (stating that a firm's Chinese Wall procedures
"must be formalized, organized, and incorporated within a firm's procedural/policy manu-
als"); Herlihy et al., supra note 131, at 4-10. The Joint NASD/NYSE Memo, provided in
response to the 1990 SEC Division Report, is discussed in Ferrara & Thomas, supra note 126,
at 191-94.
285. Section 15(f) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(f) (1988). As stated in the House
Report:
The requirements of these new statutory provisions reflect the Committee's be-
lief that broker-dealers and investment advisers must not only adopt and dissem-
inate written policies and procedures to prevent the misuse of material,
nonpublic information, but also must vigilantly review, update, and enforce
them. The Committee believes that directly imposing such affirmative obliga-
tions in the federal securities statutes will underscore the significance of such
policies and procedures and will also enhance the ability of the Commission and
the SROs to monitor and promote the effectiveness of a firm's supervisory ef-
forts. There would be direct statutory requirements for broker-dealers and in-
vestment advisers to have written policies and procedures, and those policies
and procedures and their adherence to them would be subject to Commission
and SRO inspection. Where a firm failed to comply with the statutory require-
ment to establish, maintain, or enforce reasonable written policies and proce-
dures, it would be subject to a Commission or SRO action for violation of
Section 15(f) or 204A, and potentially subject to a fine under the new Section
21A of the Exchange Act.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 6058.
286. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,626. The Report identified numerous areas
where firms lacked adequate documentation, including: (1) interdepartmental communica-




exceedingly difficult.' '287 The Division declined to adopt any standards for
documentation, but it urged the self-regulatory organizations to develop gui-
dance on minimum standards for their members. The SROs have responded
to the Division's request.288
Since the Division recommended that compliance departments play a cen-
tral role in the administration of Chinese Wall procedures, 289 the most logi-
cal and efficient course for most firms would be to make the compliance
department responsible for documentation. As the single body with ultimate
responsibility for documentation, the compliance department can help en-
sure that all significant measures are recorded and that the records are con-
sistent, complete, and nonduplicative. 290 The documentation should include
the following areas: (i) records on significant interdepartmental communica-
tions; (ii) historical records of watch, restricted, and rumor lists; (iii) records
of daily trading reviews, indicating any suspicious trades that were detected;
and (iv) documentation of efforts to investigate suspicious trades.291
c. Commitment to Training Personnel
The Report found that the majority of firms lacked formal training proce-
dures. It stressed that all broker-dealers should adopt "comprehensive, in-
teractive training programs, particularly for employees in sensitive areas,
supplemented by routine updating and reinforcement of firm policies. ' 292
The Report stated that all firms should follow the lead of a handful of New
York firms that had implemented comprehensive programs.293 One pro-
287. Id. (emphasis added).
288. Id.; see Joint Memo, supra note 284, at 241-43. The 1991 Joint Memo focused on the
minimum documentation sufficient to support the use of restricted and watch lists. For exam-
ple, documentation should memorialize: (1) the standards applied for placing securities on, or
removing such securities from, the restricted or watch list, (2) the date and time a particular
security was placed on or removed from the restricted or watch list and identification of the
contact person knowledgeable of the circumstances in regard thereto, (3) recordation of re-
views routinely undertaken with respect to employee or proprietary trading in securities placed
on the restricted or watch list, (4) the manner in which the firm oversees trading by employees
in accounts held outside of the firm in those securities on the firm's restricted or watch list, (5)
the frequency of monitoring and time periods covered with respect to employee and proprie-
tary trading, and (6) the undertaking of investigations in connection with suspected misuses of
inside information.
The record of such an investigation should include the date the investigation commenced,
the name of the security involved, identification of the applicable accounts, and a summary of
the investigation's disposition. In addition, the Joint Memo addressed the supervisory func-
tion that a firm's compliance department should have with respect to interdepartmental com-
munications. This supervision should be supported by policy statements, the use of Chinese
Walls, and proper recordation when an employee is brought over the wall. Moreover, the
Joint Memo emphasized the importance of adequate education and training. In regard
thereto, employees must attest in writing that they have adequate understanding of the appli-
cable laws, SRO requirements and in-house policies. Records of these attestations must be
retained by the firm. Employees also should be updated when the applicable requirements are
subject to change. See Ferrara & Thomas, supra note 126, at 191-94.
289. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,627.
290. See Herlihy et al., supra note 131, at 9.
291. See SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,626; discussion and authorities cited
supra note 288.
292. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,627.
293. Id.; see discussion and authorities cited supra note 288.
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gram that the Division cited favorably involved extensive education about
firm policies and the applicable securities laws during an employee's orienta-
tion period. The firm would supplement this orientation with periodic train-
ing, seminars, and memoranda to reinforce the policies and to update its
employees on new developments. 294
One concern expressed in the Report was the lack of an integrated, formal
approach to training in many firms. Since many firms were conducting some
form of training, either through internal memos, orientation material, ac-
knowledgments or certificates of compliance, one of the most effective ways
to improve procedures would be to consolidate and formalize existing proce-
dures. In this regard, firms should consider preparing binders that employees
would receive during orientation. The binders would serve as their perma-
nent reference for insider trading procedures and employees would be in-
structed to update their binders with future memos.295
4. Heightened Review of Proprietary Trading While in Possession of
Material, Nonpublic Information
The final element that the Division identified as a requirement of adequate
procedures relates to a heightened review of proprietary trading while the
firm is in possession of material, nonpublic information. The Report defined
proprietary trading to include "risk arbitrage, market making, and block
trading," but its principal concern was with risk arbitrage. 296
The Report suggests that the most prudent course would be to suspend
risk arbitrage trading involving a security while the firm possessed inside
information affecting the security, but it declined to find that such a prohibi-
tion was always necessary. 297 Based on the Commission's comments, how-
ever, a firm that engages in risk arbitrage under such circumstances may face
rigorous standards for proving the adequacy of its Chinese Wall
procedures. 29 8
The Report summarized the procedures employed by firms concerning the
294. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,620; see discussion and authorities cited
supra note 288.
295. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,620 n.20; see Herlihy et al., supra note 131,
at 10-11.
296. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,622.
297. Id. at 80,626-27. The Report stated: "The Commission has interpreted, and courts
have reviewed, the issue of firm proprietary trading when in possession of material, nonpublic
information. Although commenting that such trading should be restricted, the Commission
never has stated that proprietary trading in such a context must be prohibited." Id. at 80,619
n. 13. See SEC v. First Boston Corp., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
92,712 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (in settlement of charges relating to insider trading, First Boston
agreed to restrict its proprietary trading but declined to refrain from this practice); supra notes
147-83 and accompanying text.
298. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,626-27; see Rule 14e-3 Release, supra note
132, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,646, at 83,459-62 (discouraging
proprietary trading when firm has inside information); Herlihy et al., supra note 131, at 9-10;
Levine et al., supra note 2, at 61-62; see also Commission Division Report, supra note 137, at
84,683 ("We would stress, once again, that it remains the firms' responsibility to ensure that
Chinese Wall procedures, as well as procedures to monitor employee trading, are adequate to
address the challenging environment of High Yield research, trading, and sales.").
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other forms of proprietary trading (market making and block trading), but it
did not make any specific recommendations for these areas. With regard to
block trading, most firms do not restrict block trading while in possession of
material, nonpublic information because these trades are initiated by cus-
tomers. The firms also placed few restrictions on. market making
activities. 299
VI. GENERAL CORPORATE CONTEXT
A. ADOPTION OF COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS BY
PUBLICLY-HELD COMPANIES
1. Corporate Compliance Programs
Publicly-held corporations tend to address insider trading concerns in
three basic forms: (i) through institutional codes of conduct that cover in-
sider trading; (ii) among many other topics, through memoranda or legal
policy statements directed at specific issues involving the federal securities
laws; and (iii) through written policy statements focusing specifically on in-
sider trading.3 0 Generally, institutional codes of conduct are designed to
promote employee compliance with the relevant laws and regulations that
affect a corporation's business. 30 1 These codes are designed to promote em-
ployee compliance with a broad range of legal30 2 and ethical restraints. 30 3 A
large percentage of corporate codes already addressed insider trading com-
299. SEC Division Report, supra note 64, at 80,622-23. With respect to these practices, the
Report stated:
Block proprietary trading done to facilitate customer transactions is less likely
to be restricted than risk arbitrage activity. A number of firms noted that be-
cause block activity is not initiated by the firm and does not evidence any invest-
ment objective on behalf of the firm, it is unnecessary to restrict the activity.
These firms also indicated that the sudden withdrawal by an active block trading
desk in a particular security might serve to tip investors that the firm possessed
information, generally presumed to be positive, about that security. However, a
few firms with active block trading desks reported that such activity was re-
stricted or discontinued.
Firm procedures governing the flow of information between investment bank-
ing and market making generally contain no restrictions on market making ac-
tivity. Those firms that are over-the-counter market makers noted that
withdrawing from the market in a company with whom the firm has had a pre-
vious investment banking relationship provided a clear tip about current inside
information. Firms that continue market making activity while in possession of
confidential information either instruct their market makers to remain passive to
the market, that is, to only take the contra side of unsolicited customer trades,
or claim that such instructions are unnecessary because their market making
activity always is passive. All firms interviewed indicated that their market
makers do not make a practice of aggressively building positions in their stocks
or acting as a shadow risk arbitrage department.
Id.
300. See Alan M. Weinberger, Preventing Insider Trading Violations: A Survey of Corpo-
rate Compliance Programs, 18 SEC. REG. L.J. 180, 186-87 (1990).
301. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 62, at 1633-53.
302. See Goldblatt, supra note 66, at 22.
303. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 62, at 1634-35 (observing that "codes of con-




pliance prior to the 1988 passage of ITSFEA.3° 4 The increased liability ex-
posure of controlling persons under ITSFEA is further inducement for
companies to review and update their codes to address insider trading.30 5
Another common form of corporate compliance program is the memoran-
dum or legal policy statement. The key difference from codes of conduct is
that memoranda focus exclusively on insider trading concerns and usually
provide a more detailed discussion of the area. 30 6 This article will not distin-
guish between legal policy statements and codes of conduct, and it will gen-
erally refer to insider trading compliance procedures in this context as
corporate compliance programs. The focus here is not on the specific form
or description of the program, but on the essential elements of any corporate
compliance program addressing insider trading.
2. Decisions to Adopt Insider Trading Compliance Programs
ITSFEA does not impose an affirmative duty on publicly-held corpora-
tions to establish and maintain insider trading compliance programs. 30 7
Nonetheless, pursuant to the provisions of Exchange Act Section 21A, the
liability net extends to any organization, including publicly-held companies,
that recklessly disregarded the risk that an employee would engage in insider
trading and failed to take appropriate steps to prevent such conduct. 30 8 A
former SEC Enforcement Director opined that if an entity outside of the
securities industry had routine access to material, nonpublic information,
"there could be a case where the mere fact that a firm failed to establish any
policies and procedures whatsoever would be deemed to be reckless con-
duct." °3 0 9 Looking at this scenario from a different view, it certainly appears
304. See Weinberger, supra note 300, at 181 n.2. Subsequent to the Second Circuit's semi-
nal decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), commentators urged adoption of internal codes of conduct to
help prevent insider trading violations. See Alan R. Bromberg, Disclosure Programs for Pub-
licly Held Companies - A Practical Guide, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1139; Bruce A. Mann, Prevention of
Improper Securities Transactions by Employees. The Responsibility for and Feasibility ofAdopt-
ing Preventative Programs, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 355 (1974).
305. See Barron, Model Memoranda, supra note 52; Weinberger, supra note 300, at 183-85
(and authorities cited therein); discussion and sources cited supra notes 19-39 and accompany-
ing text. Compare Harvey L. Pitt and Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Update on Procedures for
Preventing Insider Trading in Publicly-Traded Companies, Browne Dig., Apr. 1989, at 5 ("We
read [ITSFEA] to impose a de facto requirement of all publicly-traded companies to develop
procedures governing employee securities transactions."), with Weinberger, supra note 300, at
185 ("Whether failure to develop, implement, and effectively enforce policies and procedures
to prevent employee insider trading itself evidences corporate recklessness may well depend on
the standard established by the behavior of other firms that are comparable in terms of geogra-
phy, industry, and size.").
306. See Weinberger, supra note 300, at 187; Goldblatt, supra note 66, at 22-23.
307. See Section 15(f) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(0 (1988) (imposing affirmative
duty on broker-dealers); Section 204A of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-4a (1988) (imposing affirmative duty on investment advisors). Of course, publicly-held
companies that are broker-dealers or investment advisors must maintain such procedures. See
supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
308. Section 21A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(1)(A) (1988); Pitt & Gros-
kaufmanis, supra note 62, at 1592 (stating that "controlling person provisions extend to any
public company"); supra note 305 and accompanying text.
309. Requirements of Insider Trading Act Go Beyond Securities Firms, Lynch Says, 21 SEC.
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that the presence of reasonably adequate procedures will render it more diffi-
cult for the SEC to establish recklessness on the part of controlling persons
under Section 21A of the Exchange Act.310
In this regard, it is important for companies to determine what procedures
similarly situated companies are adopting. When a court determines
whether a company acted "recklessly" or "failed to take appropriate
steps,"' 3 11 it should be strongly influenced by the corporate community's
standard of care. 3 12 Since a high percentage of large, publicly-held corpora-
tions had addressed insider trading prohibitions in their corporate codes
even before ITSFEA, 313 companies that decline to adopt a compliance pro-
gram are at risk. Prudence dictates that publicly-held companies, with ade-
quate documentation, should adopt and implement reasonably effective
procedures to safeguard material, nonpublic information. 3 14
In a context not limited to the federal securities laws, corporations may
receive additional incentives to adopt legal compliance programs under the
criminal sentencing guidelines. 315 Under these guidelines, a mitigating fac-
tor in determining the criminal sentence to be imposed is whether the subject
organization has in place an effective and operational code of conduct. 3 16
The guidelines set forth seven hallmarks of such a code, including effective
training, monitoring, and enforcement, as well as the designation of high-
level personnel with overall responsibility for compliance.
3 17
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 65 (1989) (statement by Gary Lynch); see authorities cited supra note
305.
310. Barron, supra note 52, at 195; Weinberger, supra note 300, at 183-85; supra notes 37-
39, 68-76, 305 and accompanying text.
311. Section 21A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(1)(A) (1988); see supra notes
19-39, 68-76, 305 and accompanying text.
312. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 62, at 1637 ("The fact that other similarly situated
companies have adopted, implemented, maintained, and enforced restrictive codes could re-
dound to the evidentiary disadvantage of a company that declines to follow suit."); see sources
cited supra notes 305, 309, 310.
313. See supra notes 4-18, 304 and accompanying text.
314. See authorities cited supra notes 19-39, 68-76, 304-05.
315. Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 56 Fed. Reg.
22,762, 22,787-88 (1991); Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 55 Fed. Reg. 46,600,
46,603-04 (Nov. 5, 1990); see CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: COMPLIANCE AND
MITIGATION (Jed S. Rakoff et al. eds. 1993); Jeffrey S. Jacobovitz, How to Bring Down Your
Culpability Score, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 14, 1992, at 35; sources cited supra notes 62, 65.
316. 55 Fed. Reg. 46,600, 46,604 (1990); see Webb & Molo, supra note 65, at 380-83.
317. 55 Fed. Reg. at 46,605:
The hallmark of an effective program . . . is that the organization exercised,
prior to the offense, and continues to exercise due diligence in seeking to prevent
and detect criminal conduct by its agents. Due diligence requires at a minimum
that the organization has taken at least seven general types of steps to assure
compliance with the law. First, the organization must have had policies defining
the standards and procedures to be followed by its agents and employees. Sec-
ond, a specific high-level person within the organization must have been desig-
nated and assigned ultimate responsibility to ensure compliance with those
standards and procedures. Third, the organization must have used due care not
to delegate significant discretionary authority to persons whom the organization
knew, or should have known, had a propensity to engage in illegal activities.
Fourth, the organization must have effectively communicated its standards and
procedures to agents and employees, e.g., by requiring participation in training
programs and by the dissemination of publications. Fifth, the organization must
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B. ELEMENTS OF A CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
In this context, an insider trading compliance program for a publicly-held
corporation should focus primarily on securities issued by that corporation
and its affiliates. The program also should address the additional reporting
requirements and trading restrictions imposed on statutory insiders by Sec-
tion 16 of the Exchange Act.318 Since these rules affect officers, directors,
and ten percent shareholders, corporations should adopt additional policies
to provide these persons with the necessary guidance for compliance.319
Moreover, corporate compliance programs should provide guidance to em-
ployees on how to respond to inquiries from outsiders to avoid risks of tip-
ping material, nonpublic information. 320
1. Procedures and Policies Directed at All Corporate Personnel
A corporate compliance program with respect to insider trading should
encompass the basic elements and administrative steps outlined earlier in the
article.321 A policy directed at all personnel of a large organization should
be as clear and concise as practicable. 322 Such a policy should stress that the
prohibition on insider trading encompasses trading as well as tipping mate-
rial, nonpublic information to others, including spouses, minor children, and
other relatives residing in the same household, and securities issued by any
publicly-held corporation. The policy should provide examples of insider
trading that are tailored to the corporate context. 323 As discussed below, the
policy should instruct employees not to respond to inquiries from outsiders
have taken reasonable steps to achieve compliance with its standards, e.g., by
utilizing monitoring and auditing systems reasonably designed to ferret out
criminal conduct by its agents and employees and by having in place and pub-
licizing a reporting system whereby agents and employees can report criminal
conduct within the organization without fear of retribution. Sixth, the stan-
dards must have been consistently enforced through appropriate disciplinary
mechanisms. Seventh, after an offense has been detected, the organization must
have taken all reasonable steps to prevent further similar offenses. Such steps
should include any necessary modifications to the organization's program to
prevent and detect violations of law and appropriate discipline of individuals
responsible for the offense and, as appropriate, the individuals responsible for
the failure to detect the offense. Discipline of the individuals responsible for the
offense is a necessary step to prevent a recurrence of similar offenses, but the
form of discipline that will be appropriate will depend on the facts of the case
and can range from discharge to verbal or written censure.
Id. During the recent past, there has been a proliferation of compliance programs adopted by
organizations, particularly by publicly-held enterprises. See Paul J. Curran & Gregory J. Wal-
lance, Measuring the Need for Early Disclosure, NAT. L.J., Sept. 27, 1993, at 26, 30; Nagel &
Swenson, supra note 62, at 209.
318. For discussion on Section 16, see generally 16 ARNOLD S. JACOBS, SECTION 16 OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT (1989); PETER I. ROMEO & ALAN L. DYE, SECTION 16
REPORTING GUIDE (1994).
319. See infra notes 331-42 and accompanying text.
320. See Ruder, supra note 36, at 5-6.
321. See supra notes 40-67 and accompanying text.
322. See Barron, supra note 52, at 201-02 (providing a model policy on insider trading that
could be distributed to all employees of a corporation).
323. Id. at 201 (examples of insider trading in the publicly-held corporation context: divi-
dend announcements and changes in quarterly earnings).
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and to refer all such inquiries to a designated officer or compliance
official. 324
2. Specific Policies for Directors and Officers
The federal securities laws place certain restrictions on the conduct of of-
ficers and directors with respect to their securities transactions. Accord-
ingly, a corporate compliance program should seek to provide guidance to
such persons. This section addresses certain matters that a publicly-held
company may elect to include in its policy.
As a general matter, the policy should require all officers and directors to
consult with the corporate secretary or a designated compliance person
before purchasing or selling securities issued by the corporation. 325 This
policy should extend to transactions in options or other derivative securities
that relate to the issuer's securities. 326 These measures should assist insiders
to comply with the restrictions placed on them by applicable law.
The policy for high-level officials should provide a more detailed treat-
ment of the basis for prohibitions on insider trading than the policy provided
to all employees. For example, the policy may provide examples that such
officials will be more likely to encounter than the average employee. 327 The
company should consider instituting "blackout periods" during which of-
ficers and directors would not be allowed to trade as a matter of company
policy. 328 For example, the company could prohibit trading three weeks
before and forty-eight hours after public announcement (and dissemination)
of the company's earnings. 329 The policy may also provide guidance to of-
ficers and directors so that they may determine whether they are affiliates
and thereby face restrictions on the resale of their securities. 330
a. Reporting Requirements Under Section 16(a)
Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act requires officers, directors, and ten per-
cent beneficial holders of an equity security of certain publicly-held enter-
prises to report their ownership of such securities. 331 Such publicly-held
corporations should consider the adoption of a policy that explains the re-
quirements under Section 16(a) and establishes procedures that help ensure
that these statutory insiders file the required forms.332 In 1991, the Commis-
324. See infra notes 343-48 and accompanying text.
325. See Barron, supra note 52, at 196.
326. Id.; see John F. Olson et al., Compliance Programs and Procedures, 5 INSIGHTS No. 4,
at 32, 33-34 (Apr. 1991).
327. See Barron, supra note 52, at 196-201.
328. Id. at 201; see Weinberg, supra note 300, at 188-89 (describing corporate policies pre-
scribing "blackout" periods).
329. See Barron, supra note 52, at 201.
330. Id. at 199-200. See generally MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 449-96
(2d ed. 1993).
331. Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1988). Section 16 applies only
to issuers which have securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act. Id. See
Steinberg, supra note 131, at §§ 4.01-4.08; sources cited supra note 318.




sion adopted new rules under Section 16(a) that encourage such practices by
requiring publicly-held companies to disclose any company procedures that
assist insiders with Section 16 compliance and to disclose the names of any
statutory insiders who failed to properly file the required forms.
333
The policy should explain the basic purpose of each form that must be
filed under the Section 16(a) rules 334 and the timing for the filing of each
form. 335 Finally, the policy also should state the number of copies required
of each form and the organizations with whom each such form must be
filed.
3 3 6
In addition to distributing a policy statement to all statutory insiders,
companies also should consider establishing procedures designed to assist
and monitor the compliance of these persons with Section 16(a) require-
ments. In connection therewith, the company should designate a senior per-
son, such as the corporate secretary or a senior attorney in the compliance
(or legal) department, to be in charge of assisting insiders and tracking their
compliance.33 7 The company also should consider establishing procedures
for date stamping reports received by the issuer from Section 16(a)
insiders.33 8
b. Avoiding Short Swing Liability Under Section 16(b)
The policy statement directed at the statutory insiders of a publicly-held
corporation may include procedures designed to avoid Section 16(b) liability
for short swing profits. 339 Such a policy statement should describe Section
333. See Item 405(a) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.405(a) (1994); Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 28,869, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,709, at 81,274-75 (SEC 1991); Steinberg, supra note 131, § 4.01[1], at 4-10.
334. Form 3 (Initial Statement of Beneficial Ownership of Securities); Form 4 (Statement
of Changes in Beneficial Ownership of Securities); Form 5 (Annual Statement of Beneficial
Ownership of Securities); see 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(a) (1994).
335. Form 3 must be filed within ten days of the event that caused the person to become an
officer, director, or ten percent beneficial owner. A. Jacobs, supra note 318, § 2.09. Form 4
must be filed on or before the tenth day of the month following the month in which the report-
able event occurs. Id. Form 5 must be filed within forty-five days after the end of the issuer's
fiscal year if certain transactions have occurred during the year. Id. See Steinberg, supra note
131, § 4.01[1], at 4-9; Barron, supra note 52, at 196-97.
336. The statutory insider must file: i) three copies of each form, one of which must be
manually signed, with the SEC; ii) one copy with each Exchange of which any class of securi-
ties of the issuer is registered; if the issuer has designated a single Exchange to receive Section
16 filings, one copy need be filed with that Exchange only; and (iii) one copy with a designated
person within the corporation, such as the corporate secretary. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3;
General Instruction No. 3, Form 3; General Instruction No. 2, Form 4; General Instruction
No. 2, Form 5; Barron, supra note 52, at 197.
337. See Lawrence D. Ginsburg, 25 Months and 2 Releases Later: The SEC Adopts New
Rules and Forms Under Section 16, Securities Regulation 1135 (1991); see also Olson, supra
note 326, at 33.
338. Ginsburg, supra note 337, at 1135. Another suggestion is to have the Board of
Directors, on the advice of counsel, create a list of Section 16 officers. Id.; see Steinberg, supra
note 131, § 4.01[1], at 4-10, (relying on Item 405(b)(1) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.405(b)(1) (1994)) (providing that "[a]ny form received by the registrant [from an officer
or director of such registrant] within three calendar days of the required filing date may be
presumed [by the registrant] to have been filed with the SEC on a timely basis").
339. Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). See generally Jacobs,
supra note 318, § 2.09.
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16(b)'s application to short swing trading and its disgorgement of profit (or
loss avoided) provision.340 The policy may explain how courts apply the
section strictly to match the highest and lowest prices for the insider's trans-
actions over a six-month period; as a result, an insider can actually incur a
loss over a series of trades but still be required to disgorge "profits."' 34' The
policy also may explain key concepts underlying Section 16(b). These con-
cepts include, for example, the grant and exercise of options, the concept of
beneficial owner, and the requisite holding periods.342
3. Public Disclosure Procedures
Insider trading compliance programs for publicly-held companies should
address procedures that control public disclosures made by their officers and
employees. Such procedures should minimize the risk that officers and em-
ployees tip confidential, material information to outsiders when fielding in-
quiries from persons outside of the company. 343 Companies should consider
distributing a concise policy to all personnel, instructing them to refer all
inquiries about the company to a designated corporate officer or spokesper-
son. It may be beneficial to include this policy in the company's insider
trading compliance material so that employees may better understand the
potential consequences of tipping information to outsiders. 344
In conjunction with the above policy, companies should designate an in-
formation officer, or a group of persons, to be responsible for the preparation
and dissemination of "unstructured public disclosures. '3 45 Companies also
should consider implementing detailed procedures that will guide the infor-
mation officer or group in this process. Guidelines should be established for
the periods before and after public dissemination of the company's
disclosures. 346
The policy adopted may provide specific guidance on responding to in-
quiries from investors and analysts. One such policy would be to refrain
from disclosing material information, except through the above guidelines,
340. See Barron, supra note 52, at 198.
341. Id. at 198-99. For case law applying this principle, see, for example, Whitaker v.
Whitaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1981); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d
Cir. 1943); and Morales v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 778 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
342. See Robert A. Barron, Control and Restricted Securities: Some Comments on Current
Questions Under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 18 SEC. REG. L.J. 194, 195
(1990). The policy statement for statutory insiders also should address Section 16(c)'s prohibi-
tion on short sales. See Jacobs, supra note 318, § 2.09; Barron supra note 52, at 199.
343. See generally Wesley S. Walton, Disclosure Guidelines Formulated, NAT. L.J., June
18, 1990, at 16 (outlining the elements of a public disclosure policy for publicly-held
companies).
344. See id. at 24; Ruder, supra note 36, at 5.
345. See Walton, supra note 343, at 16, 22 (defining "unstructured" public disclosures to
include press releases, executive speeches, and reports to stockholders, as opposed to "struc-
tured" disclosures which are the documents required to be filed with the SEC).
346. Id. (asserting that the designated officer should review all unstructured disclosures
prior to publication, and after publication the designated officer or group should monitor the
accuracy of reporting of the disclosures and the market reactions thereto; also, suggesting that
all material information disclosed pursuant to unstructured disclosures be made by press re-
lease and circulated to appropriate financial media and trading facilities (such as exchanges)).
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unless it has already been publicly released in a prior disclosure. 347 A policy
may elect to guide the information officer's response in a variety of situations
like responding to rumors not attributable to the company, inquiries into
sensitive topics such as mergers and acquisitions, and inquiries about the
accuracy of analysts' reports. Selective disclosure of material information to
specified analysts, shareholders, or the media should be avoided.
348
VII. CONCLUSION
The key point that perhaps should be taken from this article is that any
organization that comes into possession of inside information with respect to
publicly-held enterprises would be prudent to adopt and implement a law
compliance program designed to prevent insider trading violations.
Although by its terms ITSFEA may be construed to saddle this requirement
on broker-dealers and investment advisors only, publicly-held corporations
and professional firms (that are privy to inside information of publicly-held
enterprises) would be shortsighted to conclude that they may forego such
mechanisms. As seen from customary practice and the stance taken by regu-
lators and commentators, there arguably exists today a de facto obligation
for these organizations to adopt and implement reasonably effective policies
and procedures. Provided that certain basic procedures are adhered to, the
complexity of the program adopted should be left largely to the good faith
discretion of high-level personnel within the respective organization. These
organizations can best assess the benefits and costs involved. Nonetheless,
an organization would be prudent to embrace a cautious posture. In sum,
such organizations, taking into account the costs involved, should adhere to
as effective a program as can feasibly be implemented.
347. Id.; see Ruder, supra note 36, at 5 (observing that "the persons making disclosures
should have sufficient knowledge and skill to avoid pitfalls in making those disclosures").
348. See J. ROBERT BROWN, JR., THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE §§ 3.2,
7.3 (1989); Walton, supra note 343, at 24; see also Ruder, supra note 36, at 5-6 ("The most
important task of the office assigned responsibility for responding to inquiries will be to estab-
lish a program for dealing with requests from analysts, but other areas of concern include
dealing with the press, responding to rumors, communicating with institutional investors and
other shareholders, and communicating with specialists and stock exchanges.").
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